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THE NATIONS AT WAR

THE
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THE BIRTH OF A
NEW ERA

BY

L. CECIL JANE

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PREFACE

A HUNDRED years ago, the last general European war effected the overthrow of a military despotism. Great expectations were then formed of the dawn of a new era; they came to nothing, owing to the blunders or crimes of the victors. To-day a similar conflict is occurring, similar hopes are aroused. Many confidently predict that such hopes will be once more falsified; they despair of the future of the race, and give full rein to their pessimism. But that pessimism is unjustified. In the last century, mankind has made some progress; the democracy in every land has learned something of its power. That power can be used for good, and will be so used, if the many do not despair of themselves. The allies can be forced to remain true to the high ideals which they have professed; their victory may be the dawn of a brighter era. Unless mankind has lived in vain, that dawn is certain. It will be hastened in proportion as optimism prevails over pessimism, in proportion as the many are convinced of their ability to ensure that

the progress of mankind shall not be again interrupted. It is the purpose of this book to show what are the possibilities of good in the present war, what will be the characteristics of that new era to which it will give birth. If it does something to increase the determination of the many to eliminate those factors, which in the past have led to war, it will not have been written in vain.

L. CECIL JANE.

71 High Street, Oxford,
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THE NATIONS AT WAR

I

THE CHARACTER OF THE WAR

THE world is to-day involved in the greatest catastrophe of its history. For the moment, indeed, the full extent of the disaster is not realised. It is with reluctance that men abandon long-formed habits; even in the gravest crises, life follows something of its normal course, save in those areas which are immediately affected. But every day the situation must be better appreciated. The sorrow which millions are already enduring, and which millions more must endure before the end comes, must come nearer and nearer to the life of each individual, until at last the veriest dullard will understand. The world of yesterday has passed away, never to return; another world is in the making. Mankind is suffering the birth-pangs of a new life, of a life which, whether it be better or whether it be worse, will at least be distinct from that which has been lived.

That the new life will also be a better life is at once the hope and the conviction of mankind. The misery of war is hardly doubted. Few, if any, would deny its existence; few would dispute that in an ideal state of society those ends which are now attained by war would be attained by some less violent and destructive means. But the existing order is not ideal, and wars still occur. A belief exists that the ultimate good to be gained outweighs the misery which must first be endured; nations enter upon war, not because they seek their own hurt, but because they hope for some great recompense.

Such is the belief and the hope; their justification is less easy to discover. Such gains as may obviously be made seem hardly to counterbalance the losses which must be sustained. Territory may be annexed, affording a prospect of new outlets for trade or for a surplus population, offering hope of greater immunity from foreign attack. Yet the same outlets can be secured often, if not always, by peaceful means. A surplus population can readily emigrate and inhabit the waste places of the world. And hope of freedom from fear of attack is too generally falsified. It was upon such a ground that Alsace-Lorraine was annexed; its annexation has

burdened two nations with a weight of armaments. France has armed that she may recover, Germany that she may retain, the conquered provinces; to neither has peace or any sense of security come.

New markets may be gained by war. But those wars by which the development of hitherto neglected lands has been made possible have not generally entailed a conflict between civilised states. Great Britain possesses a vast colonial empire; she has done more than has any other state to open up and to develop lands formerly inhabited by races unwilling or unable to profit from them. But though wars have been undertaken for the preservation, and for the extension, of that empire, its foundation and its development have been the result rather of the arts of peace. Between colonisation and war there is indeed a fundamental distinction; the former suggests the penetration and development by the more progressive elements of the human race of lands hitherto neglected, the latter implies the struggle of progressive races for those lands which are already developed. Colonial wars, in fact, have largely resulted from a mistaken belief, from the idea that political possession is necessary for the possession of a market. That idea impelled

Edward III. to enter upon the Hundred Years' War with France; it was discarded by the Tudors, and its falsity has been abundantly illustrated by the history of the South American states. Trade may follow the flag; it follows much more truly the course which economic necessity suggests.

Nor is there any great element of truth in the suggestion that by means of war the best qualities in a race are developed. No nation has been more warlike than were the French from the period of the invasion of Italy by Charles VIII. to the close of the age of Louis XIV. Yet it was in that very period that all the abuses which at last produced the Revolution were stereotyped; it was a period in which the nobles grew ever more selfish, when the morals of the nation persistently deteriorated, when the kings and courtiers were consistently royal, consistently indifferent to the welfare of those whom they professed to rule and whom they actually pillaged. A war of independence, a war in which a small people resolved to gain freedom has resisted with success the military power of some tyrant, must strengthen the character of a race. But it is not the war which really produces this result; it is the sentiment of liberty, the hatred of tyranny, the denial of the right of any man or of any body of men to rule

unless by the divine sanction of popular support. Historically, it is idle to suggest that the mere fact of fighting, of gratifying those brute instincts which impel a man to kill his fellows, has any beneficial effect upon national character. Rather, war serves to call into vigorous life the more degraded instincts of mankind. Rapine and violence become general; the morals of an army in the field will rarely bear investigation. For every man who learns the virtue of endurance, a hundred learn the delights of licence.

Yet war has continued; the vision of universal and enduring peace has appeared to be as far distant as ever. Civilisation has made progress; a new and better era has seemed to be about to dawn. But at the very moment when hopes are raised to the highest pitch, a period of retrogression has constantly occurred; a new war has devastated the world, and men have been moved to exclaim with the prophet of old that they are no better than their fathers. To-day an age of peace has ended in a welter of strife. The very nations which have been in the forefront of progress have once more bent their energies to the service of destruction, and a pessimist may well declare that all the vaunted advance has been vain, that the dominion of the intellect over

brutish passions is no more real now than it was in the days of Attila and his Huns.

But in the midst of darkness a ray of light may be discovered. Resembling earlier conflicts in many respects, the present war yet possesses something of a distinctive character; it is more emphatically a war of ideals, and those ideals are far more clearly defined. Nor is this all. In those ideals there is something new, something which, by its very difference from the past, suggests ground for confidence in the future. Though the ultimate end to be secured is that end which has always been sought, the means now adopted seem to be in a measure distinct, and seem to argue at least some modification in the nature of man.

All through their history, nations, like individuals, have sought happiness; their relations with each other have been determined by their conception as to the means by which the desired goal may be reached. In the Middle Ages, it was the hope of mankind that happiness might be won by some submission to a supposed vicegerent of God. The hope was falsified by the struggle between Empire and Papacy; the period ended in the anarchy of the Reformation, in an age of almost unceasing war. For centuries

the continent remained distracted and troubled, until at last the peril of Napoleonic despotism drove the states of Europe to seek once more for a means by which war might be ended. Four great powers leagued together to destroy the aggressor; they continued their union when its immediate purpose had been accomplished, and the Quadruple Alliance, though shaken by the struggles which marked the latter half of the nineteenth century, was, in effect, revived and extended in the recent Concert of Europe. The six leading states became imperfectly united in an effort to prevent conflict and to give rest to the world.

Between the members of this concert mutual distrust reigned. It was based less on amity than on fear; less on mutual regard than on mutual jealousy. Each member watched the others, trembling lest a momentary relaxation of care might afford its professed friends an opportunity for attack, might involve the loss of an occasion to deal some fatal blow against a rival. The renewal of war was anticipated; there was no real hope of continued peace. Armaments were constantly increased; the Triple and the Dual Alliances were concluded to guard against the coming crisis.

But though no real unity was attained, the concert did suffice to postpone the crisis for some forty years. The Egyptian and Cretan questions were settled without war, even though the concord of the powers was disturbed and their reputation impaired by their sluggish ineptitude. The duration of the Turco-Greek War was limited, its consequences minimised; the quarrel between France and Germany over Morocco was stifled, though not extinguished. Europe continued to slumber uneasily; nightmare followed nightmare; but she did not actually awake to the reality of war.

Nevertheless, the concert grew persistently weaker; its members grew less and less inclined to believe in the merit of the system to which they rendered lip service. A suggestion that means might be found to limit warlike preparations was met with the gravest suspicion; the chief result of the Hague Conference seemed to be a redoubling of precautions against possible aggression by its author. Diplomatists might soothe themselves by the repetition of convenient phrases; it might be almost indecent to hint in the chancelleries of Europe that there was any lack of cordiality between the great powers. But nothing was more certain than

that the concert must sooner or later collapse; its preservation was only secured by the diligent postponement of all decisive questions, by silence upon all controversial topics.

It was left for Italy to put the concert to the test, and to reveal to the world its entire unreality. Ever since the Congress of Berlin, the efforts of the concert had been primarily directed to prevent the individual action of any one of its members in the Near East. Italy, eager to obtain for herself the last available field for expansion on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, declared war upon the Ottoman Empire, without securing the approval even of her colleagues in the Triple Alliance. She asserted the right of a great power to act upon its own initiative, and the war of Tripoli marks the real dissolution of the concert. It is true that, in deference to the idea of that concert, Italy abstained from making full use of her overwhelming naval superiority; the Adriatic and the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles were practically excluded from the sphere of active operations, and no attempt was made to end Turkish resistance by attacks upon Constantinople or Smyrna. But the Treaty of Lausanne was concluded by the belligerents without reference to the powers; a Near Eastern

problem was settled by a single state which ignored the European concert.

And the example set by Italy was speedily followed. For years the apparent certainty of intervention by the powers had served to discourage the Balkan states from attempting to profit from the increasing weakness of the Ottoman Empire; it seemed to be inevitable that they would be deprived of the fruits of victory even if they triumphed in the field. The occasion presented by the revolution which overthrew Abdul Hamid was permitted to pass; even the incapacity of Young Turk rule did not lead at once to any rupture of the peace of the Near East. But the action of Italy threw a new light on the situation; the Balkan allies rapidly availed themselves of the opportunity offered.

The concert protested; it made no effort to enforce its protest. From their original position that the *status quo* must in all circumstances be maintained, the powers retreated to acquiescence in its destruction. And this evidence of weakness was soon followed by another and more remarkable example. Ambassadors in conference revised the terms of the Treaty of London. The Enos-Midia frontier was assigned to Turkey; Adrianople was given to Bulgaria; the kingdom

of Albania was created; the question of the islands was reserved; Montenegro was coerced. But the Balkan states quarrelled among themselves as to the division of almost unexpected booty. A new war destroyed the recent treaty; Rumania intervened and dictated terms of peace; the powers accepted the *fait accompli*. Their action had resulted in little more than a partial restriction of Greece, and in vain efforts to maintain their helpless protégé, the Mpret.

The concert was thus both discredited and dissolved. The great powers had attempted and had failed to preserve the peace of Europe, and consequently, if the continent were not to sink into anarchy, into a condition of perpetual war and fear of war, some new means had to be discovered by which the turbulent elements might be held in check. Nor could there be any doubt as to the nature of the means to be tried. The concert had relied upon coercion, upon the impression of their overwhelming military strength; the concert had failed. It was inevitable that the alternative method of assent should be adopted.

But though the system of the concert has been rejected, though it is generally admitted that the new system must rest upon assent, this does not

argue complete agreement on the nature of that system. For assent may be of two kinds. It may be that assent which is given to the leadership of some single power; it may be the assent of equals. The new system may be monarchical or republican in character, aristocratic or democratic. To decide this question, the present war is being fought. It is a conflict of ideals, a war of convictions. It may be admitted that to the ruling classes in some or all of the powers engaged the struggle has a different meaning; to the masses of the people it is an effort to discover means by which peace may be secured, by which civilisation and happiness may be preserved or attained.

In the past, assent has been freely given to the domination or guidance of a single power. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, Europe was threatened by endless anarchy; she found salvation in submission to a German king. Charles the Great destroyed the liberties of Aquitaine and Bavaria; he extinguished the independence of Lombards and Saxons. But he did so as the enemy of barbarism; he was the armed champion of Christianity and of civilisation, and as such he was recognised by the world. Throughout the Middle Ages, free assent was given to the mediat-

ing power of Emperor or Pope. Even in the stormiest moments of a stormy period, men whose chief interest and joy in life was fighting observed the Peace of God and the Truce of God at the bidding of unarmed priests. But this unity of Christendom was shattered by the growth of national kingdoms and still more of national churches; even before the Reformation the Pope had become a party to the conflicts which distracted mankind, and was no longer accepted as a mediator.

From the resultant anarchy, a way of escape was sought in the creation of a concert of Europe, an idea which gradually developed. But the concert has now failed, and once more the continent appears to be faced by the prospect of perpetual war. German thinkers regard the way of escape as evident; they seek in effect to return to the mediæval system. A complete return is, indeed, rendered impossible by the very existence of national states and of national churches; however readily the nations of Europe may admit their common Christianity, they are certainly not prepared to admit the compulsory mediation of some ecclesiastic. But the continent has a common heritage in civilisation; it has a common interest in preventing a relapse into barbarism.

To many Germans, the danger of such a relapse appears to be very real. The Slav races are numerous; they are held in Germany to be barbaric, to threaten Europe as Europe was threatened by Asiatic hordes in the Middle Ages. The continent must be roused to a sense of this danger; it must recognise that in Germany alone it can find the armed champion who will save the common heritage of mankind. It would be a misunderstanding of the German character to suppose that in making this claim they are insincere. Prussian militarists may design to establish a despotism over Europe; the German people have no such desire. They are convinced that their mission is real; they believe that their armies are fighting the battle of civilisation; they lay waste Europe that Europe may be delivered from a worse fate, that it may be saved from itself.

But Europe has not been so convinced. Other nations have proved sceptical both as to the excellence of German culture and as to the reality of the Slav peril. They find no just cause for a return to the system of Charles the Great; they do not conceive that German domination is the only, or the true, path to salvation. The allies have accepted the principle of assent, but they interpret that principle in a different manner.

To them it does not imply any measure of coercion but the recognition of equality. In the past, the smaller states have been too much disregarded; in future, they must receive due recognition. Hence they have taken up arms to prevent the realisation of German aims, to secure instead the triumph of their own ideal. They stand forth as the champions of the lesser states, of Serbia and of Belgium; they stand for the principle of equality of right; they deny that right should be measured by might. To the monarchical conception of the Germans they oppose a republican conception; to the idea of a Teutonic aristocracy they oppose the idea of an international democracy. They would allow to others that liberty which they themselves enjoy; they are the champions of toleration.

And in this conflict of ideals, that ideal which the allies represent will triumph. So much is clear, if the true cause of victory in war be understood. That cause is not to be found in the factors to which it is sometimes attributed. It has often been asserted that God fights on the side of the big battalions, that numbers must win. There are, however, innumerable instances to the contrary. At Marathon and Platæa, at Pharsalia and Philippi, the larger army was defeated.

Attila failed at Chalons, Charles Martel triumphed at Tours. It has almost been the rule that those triumphs which have established the reputation of the English army have been gained in spite of inferiority in numbers. In those battles which have been termed decisive, from Marathon to Waterloo, it is almost true to say that the smaller force has generally been victorious.

Nor does history justify the view that victory is the result of purely military efficiency, either in the commander or in his soldiers. It may perhaps be argued that the only proof of capacity in a general is that he is victorious, that defeat proves incapacity. Yet there is reason to doubt any assertion that superior generalship necessarily triumphs. A study of the operations before Dyrrhachium suggests that Pompey was a greater master of the science of war than was Cæsar, but Pompey was overwhelmed at Pharsalia. Wallenstein outgeneralled Gustavus Adolphus prior to the battle of Lützen. Napoleon was assuredly a far greater general than Wellington.

And if the efficiency of the soldiers, as opposed to that of the general, be considered, it is once more clear that no inevitable cause of victory can be found here. In the past, trained armies have often been overthrown by armies which

were untrained. The levies of the Lombard cities defeated Frederic Barbarossa; the Swiss overcame the armies of the Habsburgs and of Charles the Bold. The Hussites repulsed the attacks of armies reputed to be the most efficient of the period; the Dutch won their independence despite the excellence of the troops of Spain; the raw levies of revolutionary France proved able to defeat the experienced soldiers of Prussia and Austria. And the story of more than one South African battlefield illustrates the truth that the trained and disciplined army is not necessarily victorious.

It would, indeed, be idle to contend that numbers, generalship and military efficiency count for nothing, that they are not factors which tend to make for success. But it would be equally idle to contend that either in one or all of them is to be found the true ultimate factor. There remains something above and beyond, something which may more than counterbalance all the advantage to be derived from these factors. With the party which possesses this quality victory must eventually rest.

So much has often been recognised, but the nature of the ultimate factor has been very generally misunderstood. It has been opti-

mistically hoped, rather perhaps than believed, that the right must triumph. But history does not justify any such hope. Very often, indeed, it is impossible to determine which of the two parties in a conflict has the greater righteousness; it is often rather a question of deciding which is the less iniquitous. When, however, it is possible to declare with some degree of confidence that the cause of one party is just and that of the other unjust, it is still all too frequently true that victory has waited upon wrongdoing. Most empires have been built up by means of unprovoked wars of aggression, by wars for which no moral justification is discoverable. Such exploits as the seizure of Silesia by Frederic the Great, or the partitions of Poland, can hardly be defended except on grounds of political necessity. Campaigns such as England's " opium war " against China barely admit even of this inadequate defence. Yet in these, and in numbers of other like cases, the sinner has profited and his sin has escaped all obvious retribution. Righteousness is assuredly not the ultimate cause of victory.

That cause, indeed, can be found only in the possession of a certain moral quality which confers real greatness upon its possessor. Greatness, whether in the individual or in the nation,

does not consist in a sublime originality; those men who have perhaps been most original have left but little mark on history. It consists rather in ability to focus the spirit of the age, to give expression to those hopes and desires which in others are vainly struggling to find expression. The great statesman understands, instinctively, the spirit of his nation; he becomes for the moment the very embodiment of that spirit; his policy and measures are successful and beneficial, because he gives to the people that which they really desire. The great nation equally embodies the spirit of mankind; its policy is that which the world desires; it strives to attain the objects for which the human race is striving, and adopts the methods which the human race desires should be adopted. To such a nation falls victory, whether in peace or war. But if a nation labours to impede the natural development of mankind, if its policy is in opposition to the spirit of the age, then to it will come defeat and failure.

History abounds with examples of nations which have so suffered defeat. Germany under Frederic Barbarossa strove to revive the moribund imperial idea; the coercion of the Lombard cities was to be the first step towards the forcible

imposition of unity upon Europe. Spain under Charles V. and Philip II., France under Louis XIV. and Napoleon, made similar attempts. All alike failed; failed because Europe had progressed beyond the mediæval idea, because, rightly or wrongly, it believed unity under a common head to be no longer either necessary or desirable, because national states prized highly their liberty and their complete independence. Once mankind had accepted the very principle for which a Napoleon fought; the perpetuation of the Roman Empire and the creation of the Holy Roman Empire were due to no other cause. But that day passed and those who strove to return to it were foredoomed to defeat.

And in this war, no less than in the wars of the past, victory can only rest with those who most truly embody the spirit of the age, who champion that ideal to which mankind has, even if unconsciously, given its adhesion. The German ideal is clear; the union of Europe under Teutonic leadership. But this is little more than a return to the system of the Middle Ages; it is anachronistic, nor is there any sign that the world is anxious to return to the age of Charles the Great. Such a return would involve submission to the domination of a single state. Acceptance of

German guidance, even if that guidance were wholly altruistic and designed to promote nothing save the welfare of mankind, would still involve a sacrifice of some independence. There is no sign of any willingness to make this sacrifice. Even the mild control of the concert was resented and resisted; individual states have been constantly more eager to assert their right of private judgment.

Nor is there any evidence of a belief in the suitability of Germany for the position to which she aspires. However much the achievements of the German race in various departments of human knowledge may be admired and recognised, their political system has excited but little admiration. Those maxims of policy which have been laid down by German publicists have roused indignation rather than commanded assent, and the general attitude of neutral states towards Germany since the war began has not suggested any great desire on the part of mankind that victory should wait upon her arms. In fact, Germany has failed to appreciate, and still more fails to embody, the spirit of the age; her methods and ideals are those of a far distant generation; she seeks to retard the development of mankind.

On the other hand, it is clear that the allies

advocate no outworn principle. In the past, the minor states have been very generally disregarded; attention has been paid only to those whose material strength compels respect. If the weaker nations have not been extinguished, they have owed their salvation less to any principle of policy than to the accidents of jealousy and self-interest. The Ottoman Empire has been preserved, the Balkan states were largely created, because the powers found themselves unable to arrange any partition of the Sick Man's inheritance. But the allies have now declared themselves to be the champions of the weak; they have made the cause of the lesser states their own, and by so doing they have introduced a new principle into international politics. For the first time, great powers have entered upon war deliberately and professedly for the sake of those who seemed to be unable to protect themselves.

And this principle of policy is at least more in accord with the general sentiment of the world than is the principle expounded by Germany. Ever since the Middle Ages, the public opinion of the continent has been hostile to the supremacy of a single state. The history of Europe since the fall of Napoleon has been the history of the development of nationalism, of its recognition as a

factor which cannot be ignored. But nationalism affords the justification for the existence of small states; the nationalist cause is the cause of the weak, and is the cause for which the allies have taken up arms. Mankind has long sought means by which peace might be maintained; it has failed to find it in the guidance of a single state, or in a combination of the greater states to dictate to the lesser. There remains the last alternative, the recognition of equality of states, of equality of right. This alternative the allies support, and because it is also the alternative which satisfies the desire of the human race for freedom, victory will attend them.

II

THE GENERAL RESULTS OF THE WAR

SINCE the allies have taken up arms in defence of the principle of equality, their victory, if they maintain their original position, will involve the victory of that principle. The continent will neither be directed by a few great powers nor controlled by a single dominant state; the equal rights of all nations will be recognised, the interest of all will be considered. History, however, contains many instances in which the victors in a war have abandoned those principles for which they have appeared to fight. Their minds have been corrupted or their opinions modified by success; they have adopted the maxims of their defeated opponents, and victory has in effect rested with the conquered cause.

One such instance is supplied by the history of that alliance by which Napoleon was overthrown. France attempted to impose her will upon Europe; she was resisted and defeated. But the victorious allies forgot their original professions and ideals. They had combined to deliver the continent from

a despotism; they attempted to establish a diplomatic tyranny even more complete and perhaps more burdensome than that military tyranny which they had destroyed. They invoked the sentiment of nationality in their hour of stress; in their hour of triumph they ignored that sentiment. They had championed the rights of peoples against the dominion of force; upon force alone they ultimately relied to maintain their own ascendancy. That which has happened once may happen again; the allies of to-day may be as untrue to their declared principles as were the allies of a century ago.

But there is reason, amounting almost to certainty, for believing that they will not be so untrue. Despite many superficial points of resemblance, which have been very generally remarked, there are fundamental differences between that Quadruple Alliance which defeated Napoleon and the Triple Entente which will defeat William II. A hundred years ago the champions of European liberty were themselves unfree. Austria had never deviated from the path of absolutism; Joseph II. had been an ardent reformer, but his methods were autocratic in the extreme. Catherine II. of Russia had coquetted for a moment with the idea of

representative government, but the French Revolution had cured her of any liberal tendencies. Her successors had rigidly maintained the existing despotic system; even Alexander I. had not been won over to the idea of abstract liberty at the moment when the last coalition was formed. In Prussia, the radical reforms of Stein had been abandoned; the more conservative ideas of Hardenberg had prevailed. And England was ruled by George III., who would "be king," by a Prince Regent who personified all that was worst in the monarchical idea, by a Whig oligarchy turned Tory, by a ministry which included the author of the "Six Acts" and Eldon, most consistent enemy of every liberal principle.

That such governments should distrust popular movements, and be suspicious of popular enthusiasm, was only natural. Not resting upon full confidence between ruler and subject, but rather upon ingrained habits of submission, they had no love of liberty at home. They dared not call the people to their aid, even if they conceived that to do so was possible. The war was not a people's war in any true sense; it commanded the approval of the many, but that approval was not the outcome of appreciation of the cause for which the contest was being conducted. The

continent had wearied of French despotism, but men hardly expected to find any deliverance from tyranny, hardly aspired to secure such deliverance. They merely preferred a native to an alien tyrant.

Nor were the principles of the Quadruple Alliance very clearly defined, or their motives distinguished by any particular purity. They were certainly pledged to destroy the domination of France. But they cared little or nothing for the rights of the smaller states; they were indifferent to the coercion of the weak, provided that they were themselves permitted to coerce, provided that they were themselves free from coercion. Austria was willing, if not actually eager, to prevent the fall of Napoleon, if only she could recover the provinces which she had lost, or secure adequate compensation for them. The allies had as much will to dominate the continent as had France; they merely lacked the power.

In one aspect, indeed, the war against Napoleon was no more than a contest for dominion. Neither party to that war sincerely desired the liberation of the continent. "To divide the spoils of the vanquished" was the original, hardly less than the ultimate, aim of the allies; it was perhaps only diffidence as to the eventual outcome of the

conflict which for a time led them to conceal their true purpose under a profession of liberal intentions.

The allies to-day are acting from far purer motives; their principles are far more clearly defined. There is in them no disposition to ignore the rights of the smaller states. On the contrary, it was to defend those rights that they entered upon the war. The attempt of Austria to coerce Serbia led Russia to mobilise; the violation of Belgium led England to intervene. A declaration by the Tsar in favour of Polish liberty marked the earliest stages of the conflict, and though this might be regarded as a mere political move, calculated to embarrass Germany and Austria, there is no reasonable ground for supposing that the promises made will remain unfulfilled when victory has been won.

Nor can the determination of France to recover Alsace and Lorraine be regarded as proof of selfishness. Those lands were annexed to the German Empire mainly with a political object. A wish to retain them served to reconcile the south German states to the dictation of their hereditary enemy; the Reichsland seemed to create a necessity justifying the whole Prussian military system. But so long as that system endures, so

long the German Empire will possess the power of aggression and will continue to aspire to dominate Europe. The retrocession of the provinces to France hence becomes the obvious means by which the end for which the alliance has been formed may be attained. Prussian militarism will have failed to accomplish the object for the accomplishment of which it has been permitted to exist; it will be discredited, and the German people forthwith be converted to acceptance of a system more in accord with their national character.

The same argument applies to other territorial changes which may fairly be anticipated. The greatest obstacle to the full recognition of equality among the states of Europe comes from that repressive militarism of which Germany and, in a sense, Austria are the chief exponents. Possessing great armies and ruled by a military caste, they tend naturally to adhere to the doctrine that right is might; they tend naturally to desire to impose their will upon Europe, even though that desire may itself be prompted by a sincere belief that thus Europe will be benefited. Germany and Austria must be so reconstituted that they will abandon their present system, that their peoples will be both convinced of the excellence

of change and able to enforce that conviction. And that this reconstitution may be effected, the political map of Europe must be redrawn.

But to argue that because the allies will eventually redraw that map, therefore their object in making war was to redraw it in their own interest, is to argue from a misunderstanding of the necessities of the situation. The allies will indeed reorganise the continent in their own interest, but that interest is assuredly the interest of all other states, both great and small. It does not prove any lack of purity of motive.

And as the motives of the allies are purer than were those of the members of the Quadruple Alliance, so their internal organisation fits them better for the championship of liberty. England and France are countries in which popular influence on government is recognised and has long been recognised as a fundamental principle. It is unthinkable that in either a government should exist which does not possess at least that degree of popular support which is implied in the possession of a majority in an elected legislative assembly.

It may, indeed, be admitted that in no state can a government exist which is not at least ultimately supported by the political majority of the nation, by the majority, that is, of those

who hold any definite political opinions. Commands may be issued; obedience cannot be permanently enforced. Despotism is always tempered by assassination; revolt is the final weapon in the hands of a disaffected people. But the support given to a government may be of two kinds. It may be merely the result of lack of initiative, of absence of debate; it may be merely the result of ingrained habits of submission. Such obedience was rendered to the oriental despotisms of the past; such obedience has been rendered in more recent times to many absolute monarchies.

But there is also a different type of obedience, that which is voluntarily rendered by a free people. This is the type of obedience which is given to rulers who are really selected by the subjects, the support accorded to chosen representatives. Those who obey are consciously the equals of those who rule; they are, in fact, themselves the ultimate rulers. Their obedience is reasoned, not servile; it is the result not of ignorance or of fear, not of superstition or of mental pauperism, but of a developed political sense, of a conviction that liberty is not licence, that freedom is not anarchy.

Such obedience to authority is rendered in

England and in France. In each country government rests upon the reasoned assent of the governed. Popular approval of policy is ensured by the fact that it is the people who really determine the policy which shall be pursued; their preliminary approval is indeed essential. Co-operation between rulers and subjects is not merely possible but inevitable; in the present struggle, the people both can and must be granted the fullest possible share. In such circumstances a government can have no fear of the political consequences which may result from a victory gained by an alliance between ruler and ruled. No revolution will result; there is no debt which the governments of France and England can contract towards their subjects which they would be unwilling or unable to discharge. Neither power need hesitate to preach the gospel of liberty and of justice for the weak. And thus they are well qualified to champion the principle of international equality. Upon that very principle their own existence rests; they aim at nothing more than the extension to the relations of state with state of that very system which at home they have already adopted. Nor does such championship of the weak constitute any great innovation in their foreign policy. France has ever been

sympathetic to the Poles, England has never been unmoved by the cries of the oppressed. Both nations have done service for the cause of liberty throughout the world.

But there is a third member of the Triple Entente, whose institutions appear to be less in accord with the principles of the allies, whose sincerity in preaching liberty may seem to be more open to question. Russia has long been more autocratically governed than has any other state. Her rulers have repressed with vigour all liberal manifestations; the exponents of liberty have been condemned to death or to an exile worse than death. Her area is vast, her resources almost incalculable. Her civilisation has been disputed; her people have been very generally regarded as backward and almost barbarous. Flushed with victory and controlled by a militarist caste, she might well expose the peace and liberty of Europe to dangers far greater than any which could result from Prussian ambition. Her power for good or for evil can hardly be measured, and it is little wonder that many who would otherwise welcome the victory of France and England dread the consequences of a victory gained by the aid of Russia.

Yet there is reason to believe that such dread

is needless, that the undoubted power of Russia will be used for good, that in that empire a new and brighter era is dawning. For centuries Russia has been controlled by an alien ruling class; Germans and Swedes have commanded, Slavs have obeyed. The Romanovs themselves are only a degree less German than the Guelphs. Rurik himself was a Scandinavian; the greatest perhaps of his successors, Catherine II., was a German. Of the favoured ministers of the Tsar, few indeed have been Slavs, and the contempt of the Russian aristocracy for the peasantry is the measure of that aristocracy's alien character. It is little wonder that a despotic spirit should have pervaded the administration, that repression should have been general, that nameless atrocities should have been committed. All was needed to bolster up a non-national *régime*, to secure the continued submission of the Slavs.

For those atrocities the Slav race cannot with justice be held responsible. Some have indeed served and defended the despotic system, some have committed deadly crimes against their nation and against mankind, but it is not in such that the true spirit of the race finds expression. That spirit is to be found in the attitude of the Russian masses towards the policy of their rulers. The

Japanees War left those masses unmoved; to them, it seemed to be some mere sordid quarrel for distant ports, a quarrel which involved no principle and which was not sanctified by any high ideal. But the same masses had been stirred to their very depths by the struggle of the Greeks for independence, by the miseries of Bulgaria; they have been stirred to-day by the peril of their brothers in Serbia. The race has risen to defend that which it holds to be right and just; it is fired with a generous enthusiasm, all-believing and unconquerable.

In the past, the Slavs have been similarly moved. They have answered gladly to the summons of their Tsar; they have laid down their lives freely, have died that others might live. No sacrifice has seemed too great to be made for the cause of liberty; all the faults of their rulers have been forgiven, all the misery of the past forgotten, in an outburst of passionate devotion. But when by such devotion victory has been gained, the Tsars have failed to display gratitude to their people. The former system has been maintained; heavy punishment has once more awaited those who have dared to speak of freedom. A Germano-Swedish aristocracy has continued to oppress the Slavs, whom they have for a time exploited.

Once more a Tsar has called upon his people; once more his people has responded to that call. It may be that once more also they will be betrayed, that once more the devotion of the Slavs will pass unrewarded. But the Russia of to-day is not the Russia of a past generation. Into the nation there has entered a new and more vigorous spirit, a spirit which has found expression in an outburst of literary activity. The Slavs have learned to realise their national identity and their power. Some advance has been made towards the establishment of representative government; slowly but surely a more liberal spirit has begun to pervade the administration. Already the dominion of the alien is undermined. Russia, indeed, is on the eve of revolution, not of a revolution of bombs and daggers, but a revolution of peace, by which political power will at last be given to the true Russian people. And since that people has in the past both suffered from tyranny and struggled to save others from oppression, it is reasonable enough to believe that it will not now betray the cause which it will aid to victory. Rather, Russia, no less than England and France, will be true to the cause of equality among nations, true to the cause of the weak. The defeat of Germany will not mean the substitution of one

tyranny for another, of one domination for another, but the end of domination, the dawn of a new era of liberty.

One factor, and one factor alone, may seem destined to falsify this hope, the imperfection of human nature. In the past, nations have proved reluctant to sacrifice private advantage to the common good; the difficulty of those problems which have appeared to be insoluble save by war has been due to the selfishness and intolerance of states. That selfishness can be removed only by a change in human nature. Until men are actuated by a fuller sympathy with their fellows, until they are inspired by the spirit of toleration, it is idle to expect that the world will be freed from conflict. For intolerance of others, refusal to see their point of view, lies at the root of all strife, of all hatred and enmity, whether between individuals or between nations. And war is no more than the most vigorous expression of intolerance, of an intolerance so intense that it impels to murder.

It may seem idle to expect that this intolerance will be removed. No previous war has served to accomplish this result; the hopes which have been formed of a dawn of universal peace have been again and again falsified, until those who

have continued to hope have been regarded as incurable optimists, amiable perhaps, but foolish to a degree. And already those who have suggested that the present war will end war have been warned that they are hoping for the impossible. They are reminded that when Napoleon had been overthrown an exactly similar hope for a while prevailed, that on the very eve of the outbreak of the Crimean War many were asserting that the peace of Europe could never more be disturbed. They are reminded also that on the eve of the outbreak of the present conflict similar assertions were made, and they are warned that it is blind folly to expect that the history of the future will differ materially from the history of the past. They are informed, in effect, that the present war is but one more of those periodic catastrophes to which the world is liable, that human nature is immutable, that so long as the human race endures wars will endure also.

For all these contentions there is a superficial justification. The present war does resemble previous wars in many respects; its ultimate cause, divergence of opinion as to the true path of happiness, has been the cause also of all other conflicts. Yet a great and vital difference also exists. It is not merely that the allies have

entered upon the conflict with purer motives and with greater justice than nations have ever entered upon war in the past. It is not merely that the division between the two parties is clearer and more complete, extending to their internal organisation no less than to their external policy. The difference is even greater. Whether the area affected be considered, or the economic interests involved, or the numbers of the armies engaged, the present struggle assuredly deserves the epithet " titanic "; it is in very truth a world war; it is the most tremendous conflict that mankind has ever seen. And in this fact lies hope, sure and certain, that its results will be greater and more beneficial than have been the results of any previous conflict.

Men are moved by nothing more readily than by the immense, by that which is so vast as to pass the comprehension of finite minds. And by its very immensity the present war will do far more than redraw the political map of the world, far more than shift the balance of power from this state or group of states to that, divert trade from one channel to another. All these things will be accomplished, all these and more. That will be effected which has not been effected by any previous upheaval, which Christianity itself has

failed to achieve. Since the dawn of Greek civilisation human nature in its essentials has appeared to be immutable. Those hopes, fears and passions which moved men in the days of Homer move men still to-day. They love and hate with the same ardour and with as little reason; they commit the same crimes and perform no less heroic deeds. Their extravagance and folly seem hardly to have diminished; the men of to-day seem to be no more rational than were the warriors of the siege of Troy.

But though at first sight human nature has not appeared to change, there is no reason for supposing that it is therefore unchangeable, that the race has lived the last four thousand years in vain, that History must for ever be " the register of the crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind." Rather, there is reason to believe that human nature has changed and that it will change still further. Even if the old passions still burn, even if the former imperfections can still be found, yet knowledge has increased, the area of civilisation has been widened. The intervals of peace between nations have grown longer; though wars have not ceased, they have become less frequent. Human sympathy has deepened, human cruelty has diminished. National crimes

are rarer, the atrocities of an infuriated army arouse more resentment, the very criminals seek to palliate their criminality. Attila produced no apologies for his barbarities; his modern imitators deny that they have been barbaric. A great and far-reaching change has been coming over human nature.

That change can only be accelerated by the present crisis in the history of the world. Men are ever sobered, rendered more thoughtful, by adversity; nations are brought to a deeper consciousness of duty. Of the adversity which the present conflict will produce there can be no doubt; the misery will be greater, the sorrow more intense, than the race has ever known. But out of adversity good will come. Men will learn a higher and a truer wisdom; experiencing to the full the evil of violence, they will learn to appreciate its folly. Having been brought to sorrow by intolerance, they will learn the merit of toleration. Human nature will be changed, and so changed as to render enduring peace possible and certain.

For the prevalence of a new spirit will serve to end war. It is in the sentiment of intolerance alone that the cause of war is to be found. Lack of sympathy between races, mutual distrust, has

made the growth of armaments a possibility; the masses have permitted the establishment of a militarist *régime*, which they have hated, because they have also learned to believe that all men must for all time pursue their own selfish interest, that they must ever make their choice between slaying and being slain. But the calamities which the world now endures will destroy this intolerance; in its place a new spirit of toleration will prevail, a toleration based not upon contempt but upon respect, not upon necessity or fear but upon love, a toleration which is divine. Inspired by that spirit, nations will learn that they have believed a lie, that there is no necessary and permanent conflict between one people and another, that all may labour together to promote the welfare of the race.

And so this war, which the allies have undertaken for the defence of the weak and for the establishment of the principle of equality among nations, will not end in a return to the old order but in the evolution of a new world. International relations will be inspired by that spirit which produced the alliance. In place of the dominion of the mighty there will appear a new harmony, a sincere desire to do justice to the weak. Equality of right will be regarded in place of inequality

of might; to the smaller states will be accorded that consideration to which they are entitled. In any civilised state, it is already recognised that the poverty or physical weakness of an individual do not excuse his persecution or oppression; rather, they are held to justify the granting of a special measure of protection. Henceforth, the same conviction will prevail among nations; the material weakness of a state will no longer be regarded as ground for its coercion by greater powers. Nations will no longer pursue their own interest without regard for others; they will realise that their own true interest lies in due consideration for the interest of all.

Nor is it in international relations alone that this new spirit of toleration and sympathy will appear. Resulting from a change in the very nature of man, from the completion of a revolution which has been slowly developing through the ages, it will affect every form of human activity. Political parties will learn to respect one another; those who hold different religious creeds will recognise that with all their divergence of belief they may still work together for the attainment of a good which is above and beyond all mere dogma, which is eternal and divine.

Class prejudice and social prejudice will be softened and obliterated; even the conflict of sex, the most enduring of all forms of conflict, will experience the same influence. All will realise their mutual dependence; all will realise that there is a work to be done for humanity to which all can contribute, to perform which is the whole duty of man.

Such changes, indeed, may not and indeed cannot be instantaneous; there is no lesson which does not require time in the learning, and the lesson which is now to be learned is not easy. It is far simpler to prevent the great crimes of violence than to prevent the deadlier crimes which kill or maim not the body but the soul. It is far easier to end strife between nations than to end the more insidious strife of individuals. Yet adversity is a skilled teacher; the lesson of the present evil time will assuredly be learned, and, that task accomplished, the nations of the world will enter upon an age of peace, which will endure for all time. Armageddon will have been fought; the powers of good will have triumphed. In a new and a better world, the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount will no longer be regarded as so ideal as to border upon folly; those who would strive to obey it will no longer be greeted

with a smile of almost pitying contempt. And those who in the cause of liberty and toleration have laid down their lives on the battlefields of Europe will win the blessings of generations that are yet unborn, of millions upon millions who will cherish and reverence the memory of those who died that by their death sunshine might enter into the lives of the weakest and the lowliest.

III

THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

THOUGH the present war will effect a revolution in the nature of man, it cannot be supposed that it will also destroy that desire for happiness which has ever been the mainspring of all human action. The desire will remain; the means by which it may be gratified will be more fully understood; the errors of the past will be avoided, and the quest will be at last successful. Hitherto the attainment of happiness, whether by nations or by individuals, has been prevented by lack of tolerance. Men, convinced of the rectitude of their own opinions, have regarded the contrary ideas of others as being almost deliberately mistaken; they have insisted with vigour upon their own point of view, and by this insistence they have caused disputes and have destroyed alike peace and contentment. Lack of tolerance has led to the adoption of extreme courses and of extreme views. Men have demanded power to impose their own opinions upon their misguided fellows, or they have sought liberty

to pursue their own course without regard to the welfare of others. The human race has oscillated between despotism and anarchy; it has found happiness in neither, and yet the wavering between the two extremes has continued, mainly because the imperfect nature of man both makes some measure of control necessary and renders that control to some extent pernicious.

And nations have displayed no greater wisdom than have individuals. They have sought salvation in the same extremes, have sought and found not. International politics have been marked by the same ill-advised search for happiness as has marked the political life of each state and of every individual. Viewing life soberly, men realise the folly of violent reactions and appreciate the unwisdom of their ancestors. Yet unconsciously they imitate those ancestors, nor are there any lessons which have been better known or worse learned than the lessons which are writ large on the pages of history. The veriest child in politics understands that the ideal of the Holy Roman Empire was impracticable and false; experienced statesmen have failed to understand that the identical idea was the inspiration of the recent concert of Europe. Men despise the

irrational conduct of others; their own conduct is not a whit less irrational. We smile at the insane idealism of lovers; falling in love, we find that idealism in ourselves reasonable and sane. It has ever been the fate of man to perceive the mote in his friend's eye, while ignoring the beam in his own eye. And the same fatality has pursued nations.

But all the errors which have been committed alike by individuals and by nations have in reality arisen from an inability to appreciate the standpoint of others, from a lack of toleration. This lack has prevented appreciation of the intrinsic imperfection of any given course, and hence has led to the adoption of that course in a most extreme form. The most ardent advocates of broadmindedness have yet believed that their own opinion is intrinsically right, that they may justifiably impose that opinion upon others. Desiring to be tolerant, they have been as dogmatic as those whom they have attacked on the very ground of dogmatism. They have denied the equal rights of their fellows by their actions while proclaiming them with their lips. Inability to take wide views has been, indeed, the greatest curse of the human race. To it must be traced all political, religious, social persecu-

tion; it has led to the propagation of dogmas in religion and in social relations, in politics, literature, music and art. It has led to dogmatism in international politics, a dogmatism which has found expression in attempts to order the world in the interests of a few states.

Those few states have been the so-called great powers. It has become an axiom of international politics that certain states, possessed of greater territorial strength, greater material and military resources, are thereby entitled to dogmatise to the world, entitled to order international politics according to their own conception of the advisable and just. More especially has this been the case since the close of the Napoleonic wars. At the Congress of Vienna, the four allies openly declared their intention of dividing the spoils of the vanquished. At the Congress of Berlin, the map of the Balkans was redrawn in the real or supposed interests of the great powers. More recently, the ambassadorial conference in London was concerned less to secure a lasting peace than to give satisfaction to Italy and Austria.

But the result of this domination by the greater states has, of necessity, been the suppression of nationalism, the tyrannical coercion of the weaker states. In place of the view that the weak are

entitled to the fullest consideration, the view has prevailed that the desires of the strong need alone receive attention. And since the dominions of the great powers in the majority of cases contain districts not attached to them by any bond other than an artificial political link, it followed as a matter of course that nationalism should be repressed. For nationalism is the creed of the weak, the justification of the existence of small states. It is almost necessarily antipathetic to the conception of a wide empire, for any such empire must entail the dominion of one race over others. England and France are the most homogeneous of the great powers; yet even they hold in subjection millions of subjects whose claims to national existence they entirely deny.

This suppression of nationalism has been plausibly justified. It has been argued that it is demanded in the interest of peace, that the nationalist principle is essentially productive of strife. Up to a certain point this contention is just enough. All wars since Waterloo, and indeed earlier wars also, have been produced by the existence of national sentiment. Nothing else impelled the Italian cities to resist Frederic Barbarossa, the Swiss and the Dutch to assert their independence, Europe to resist the domina-

tion of France. To the national spirit must be traced all revolts, all refusal of a people to submit to alien domination.

But refusal to recognise national rights is merely intolerance, the same intolerance which leads a government to refuse equal rights, political or religious, economic or social, to its subjects. Intolerance of mind in a state produces aggression; that aggression provokes hostility, and the hostility culminates in war. The present conflict is no exception to this rule. Germany aspired to guide and hence to dominate Europe. But her policy threatened the existence of some states directly, of all indirectly, and the more so as both she and her ally, Austria, have been the determined enemies of all national life, the apostles of the creed of the survival of the fittest. The war is in essence a struggle between heterogeneous and homogeneous states, between dominion based upon force and dominion based upon goodwill. The allies have insisted upon this fact; France has called the Turcos to her aid, England the Indians, Russia the Poles.

The mere occurrence of the present war is evidence of the failure of the policy of repression. If the principle of nationality had been admitted, there would have been no Serbian question; if

the equal rights of smaller nations had been sincerely recognised, Belgium would have been secure. In other words, if toleration had been established in Europe, if the principle of toleration had been accepted loyally and sincerely, there would have been no war. But as it was not so accepted, the inevitable aggression occurred, and the inevitable resistance to aggression. This war is one last proof of the error of repression, of the invalidity of the doctrine which has prevailed since the Congress of Vienna, that all international questions should be determined by the wishes or necessities of the great powers.

And by reason of its very magnitude, this war also supplies the most convincing proof that has ever been produced. Of necessity it must cause nations to consider whether those means which they have hitherto adopted to secure happiness are indeed calculated to attain that end. Not less must it serve to convince men of the need that some means for avoiding the calamities of war should be discovered. For the present conflict will bear in its train calamities far greater than have ensued from any previous war, greater because the area affected is also greater, because the engines of destruction have been brought to a higher pitch of perfection, because years of

peace have given the nations concerned time to accumulate vaster stores of wealth, because a higher standard of comfort causes privation to be more acutely felt. And since experience of evil always causes men to ponder, nations to become more reflective, the mind of the world will be moved at last to consider whether it is indeed inevitable that international relations should be based upon mutual distrust, whether the world must of necessity be an aggregation of states each jealously watching its fellows. For so long as military strength is the necessary foundation for national liberty, so long every nation must strive to increase its power unless it is prepared to submit to the dictation of others; each is bound to watch jealously any advance made by others, since that advance contains a veiled threat. Europe must be an armed camp so long as it is controlled by the great powers; every state desires some share of that control and can gain it only by arming and preparing for war.

Even, however, if the calamities of the present war did not serve to cause reflection, mere necessity would suggest the pursuit of a different path to happiness. After the Napoleonic wars, Europe sighed for peace; fear of war and revolution became for a time the dominating factor in

politics. Upon that fear rested the ascendancy of the Quadruple Alliance; in that fear was found the justification for the general repression of liberalism. The continent was to be led to happiness by means of an alliance of overwhelming military strength; content was to be secured by the prevention of all free development. The attempt was unsuccessful. Though peace was maintained for a while, it ended in years of turmoil. Intolerance had been adopted as the fundamental principle of international relations; it had proved to be a wrong principle. The allies who defeated Napoleon provided a lesson for posterity, and slowly that lesson has been learned. Slowly, for the recent concert was no more than an attempt to reproduce the Quadruple Alliance; an attempt, the half-hearted character of which suggested that the great powers themselves were becoming convinced of the futility of the method of coercion. But since intolerance has been tried and found wanting, since its failure is palpably obvious, and yet the end which intolerance was directed to attain is still the end for which nations strive, the only alternative method must perforce be adopted. Tolerance must be tested; free assent must take the place of coercion.

And unless the quest for happiness is doomed to be for ever vain, it is in the adoption of toleration that the true path lies. Hitherto, it has never been adopted, since the nature of man drives him towards extremes. But the present war will increase the desire for peace, as the war against Napoleon increased that same desire. Past history will point the way to peace; calamity will modify human nature, and that modification will enable men to pursue the right path. Conflict will cease, not because it is temporarily prohibited by the great powers, but because it will have become hateful to the conscience of mankind. It will be avoided, not by the method of compulsion, but by the removal of the ultimate cause. Taught of misfortune, moved to learn the lessons of the past, men will essay toleration, will avoid those extremes which have produced all past conflicts. The race will pursue a wiser path, and, pursuing it, will attain that goal for which mankind has striven since the dawn of civilisation.

And no sooner has it been recognised that peace is not attainable by force, cannot really be based upon compulsion, than the doctrine of assent secures ascendancy. The principle of liberty, of toleration, becomes the guiding prin-

ciple of international relations. Of this the first result must be the adoption of nationalism as the broad basis of the organisation of human society. Repression of national aspirations has been the general rule since the fall of Napoleon; it has been productive of war, and the cause of those wars has been misunderstood. Because some states would be subverted and others embarrassed by the application of the national principle to them, because the struggles of the last century have been nationalist in character, it has been rashly concluded that the principle is necessarily productive of conflict and that its adoption could only mean unending strife. But it has been less nationalism than the repression of nationalism which has caused conflict; wars have occurred, not because the national principle has been accepted, but because it has been rejected. This truth has now secured recognition; even while the concert still subsisted, the powers abandoned the attempt to maintain the *status quo* in the Balkans, its maintenance being impossible for no other reason than the fact that it conflicted with nationalism. In other words, the powers recognised that in one instance at least recognition of nationality afforded the greatest hope of peace

A fuller recognition of this truth will be the

first result of the present war; it will lead to the adoption of nationality as the broad basis of settlement. Already this has been suggested by the conduct of the allies. Refusal any longer to permit the repression of peoples is seen in the defence of Serbia by Russia, of Belgium by England; it is seen also in the proclamation to the Poles. Yet it is also clear that nationality cannot be the complete basis, that it cannot be everywhere applied. There are districts in which two or more races are inextricably mingled; no human ingenuity could devise a means by which the national principle could be there applied. It would lead to a strange conglomeration of enclaves, which would afford food for endless disputes. This difficulty has been fully realised in the past; its realisation has done much to hinder the adoption of the broad principle. The problems presented by such a district as Macedonia have appeared so insuperable that the task of solution has not really been attempted.

But though a complete adoption of nationalism is clearly impossible, its broad application is not the less certain. Mankind, resolved to avoid further war, convinced that the former methods are unsatisfactory, will be convinced also that nationality must be recognised, that such re-

cognition affords the only hope of success in the quest for happiness. The principle of toleration will gain ground, and it has only been the absence of that principle which has made the acceptance of nationality so difficult in the past. International jealousies have complicated the question; those jealousies are themselves expressions of intolerance, and with the decline of intolerance jealousy will pass away also. Nationality will become the general principle; the thorny questions of mixed races will be solved by the mere existence of a resolve to allow for the point of view of others.

And the map of Europe will therefore be redrawn. The details of that redrawing cannot be settled academically, but certain general results may be indicated with confidence. The system of dualism has gone for ever. Austria-Hungary may or may not continue to exist; the domination of the German-Magyar alliance has passed away. Whether the solution of the Austrian problem is to be partition or trialism or federalism, at least the Slavs can no longer be denied equal rights. The emergence of that race is inevitable. Beyond such broad generalisations, however, it is impossible to proceed. It is idle to attempt to forecast what compensation will

eventually be accorded to Belgium, what frontier will be acquired by France, what will be the exact fate of Schleswig-Holstein, of the Czechs and of the Roumans. That the aggressions of great powers will be checked is certain; it is certain that when the map is redrawn the smaller states will greatly benefit.

For the very adoption of nationality is the recognition of the smaller states. It involves their creation and their maintenance. In the past, the weak have been sacrificed; intolerance in international politics, as in all other relations of life, has involved the persecution of minorities. That persecution, when directed against small states, has been justified on the very grounds upon which governments have justified political and religious persecution of their subjects. Denial of liberty has been defended on the assumption that liberty must degenerate into licence; in order to avoid the evils of anarchy, violence has often become the real rule of human society. But a *régime* of violence must necessarily penalise the weaker; in the relations of state with state, it has involved the sacrifice of nationality. When, therefore, nationality becomes the basis of international politics, liberty must replace violence. The measure of right must cease to be might;

the claim of a nation to be free must be based not on the ability of that nation to resist aggression, but upon its inalienable right to liberty.

Yet even when human nature is modified, and when toleration has become the rule of life, disputes will still arise. In the most civilised and ordered state, quarrels between individuals constantly occur, quarrels in which each party is sincerely convinced of the justice of his cause. And however civilised the relations of states may become, they will yet inevitably quarrel; questions will arise for decision between them. Hitherto such questions have been ultimately settled by war, with the result that they have been decided also not necessarily in accordance with equity but by superior military strength. If the weaker have sometimes been safeguarded, it has only been at the cost of some loss of independence and because such protection of the weak seemed to accord with the interests of the strong. There has been no clear conviction of the rights of the smaller states; there has been no willingness on the part of the larger to sacrifice one iota of the advantages conferred upon them by reason of their very magnitude.

But it is impossible that war should continue to be the ultimate deciding factor, if the rights of the

weak are to be genuinely regarded. Those rights would rest upon no sure foundation; they would depend on the dubious goodwill of the great powers. Another method of deciding disputes must be found, and it can be found only in a system of arbitration. Arbitration, however, can only be enforced by means of some species of concert, and at first sight the restoration of the old alliance between the great powers would perhaps seem to be inevitable. But it may be suggested that between the concerts of the past and the new league there will be a great and fundamental difference. Originally there was a more or less sincere resolve to maintain the *status quo*, that *status quo* being based upon the rejection of nationality and being by that very fact oppressive to the smaller states. The present war, from the point of view of the allies, has been undertaken for the defence of those smaller states; nationality has been accepted and its acceptance involves the safeguarding of the interests of the weak. The new concert, therefore, can be no mere league of the great powers; it must be a wider union, inspired by a higher principle, involving not the repression of the weak but the recognition of their equality in rights. The methods of the old concert resembled the operation of lynch law in

a half-civilised country; the new concert will inaugurate the reign of law as understood in a really civilised community. Nations will combine to maintain international good order and morality as citizens combine within a state; their guiding motive will be complete and equal justice for all.

Yet as in all states, however civilised, there are some actual or potential law-breakers, so it may be anticipated that this dominion of international law will not be wholly unopposed. A lie ever dies with difficulty; the lie that nations are and must always be actuated only by selfish motives will die with difficulty. The masses for a while will still be deceived, still led to believe that they are threatened by their neighbours and that the danger can be repelled only by a counter-attack. A ruling, militarist caste will for a time be able to maintain its domination; it will certainly seek to perpetuate that domination by aggression. And it will be the task of the new concert to resist and to prevent that aggression, and by preventing it to complete the education of the world and to prevent war.

The means are ready to hand. Nationalism supplies the principle which will guide the conduct of the concert; all attempts to repress nationalism will be resisted, and the state which opposes the

accepted principle will be treated as are would-be criminals within the state. Pressure will be brought to bear upon it, and its good conduct ensured. That pressure is of two kinds, sentimental and economic. Public opinion, the world having experienced the evils of an aggressive policy, will be hostile to the aggressor, who will thereby be assured beforehand of an entire absence of sympathy with his projects.

And backed by public opinion, the economic weapon becomes all-powerful. Hitherto, public opinion has been generally divided; the aggressor has been able to appeal successfully to the self-interest and jealousies of other states. But in the present war, and before all its evils have been experienced, it is noteworthy that not a voice has been raised in defence of German aggression. Not only are the peoples of the allied states unanimous in their support of the war, a phenomenon never before witnessed, but neutral states are equally convinced of the justice of the allied cause. Germany is fully aware that she can expect no support from the benevolence of neutrals. When the evils of this war have been fully experienced, public opinion, already strongly opposed to aggression, will be still more convinced, and by its conviction

will make possible the full use of the economic weapon. Refusal of loans, stoppage of trade, will readily convince the would-be criminal that his crime cannot be committed; he will be driven to obey the law, whether he will or no. Without the moving of a single ship or regiment, war will be rendered impossible, and the reign of arbitration established.

Everywhere society will be reorganised upon the broad principle of toleration, finding expression in the recognition of nationality. As the war is universal, so also will be its results; not merely Europe, but the whole world, will be remodelled. The recognition of the equal rights of strong and weak will be general, and the human race, long distracted by its predilection for extreme courses, will at last secure that peace for which it has always striven. Nor will the peace be merely temporary. Appalled by present calamities, instructed by past errors, human nature will be modified, and, in the world which will be born from this conflict, nations will realise the blessing of moderation, their mutual tolerance will serve to solve all disputes.

IV

IMPERIAL POLITICS

All empires which the world has hitherto seen have involved a certain measure of repression. Established in the majority of instances by means of aggressive wars, they have been maintained in existence by similar means; a ruling race has held sway over more numerous subject peoples. The very word "empire" connotes a degree of coercion; history most abundantly justifies this connotation. The Athenians imposed the payment of tribute upon the former members of the Delian Confederacy; Lacedæmon established her harmosts in the cities which accepted her hegemony. Civilised Greeks and barbarous Gauls alike were compelled to accept the laws and institutions of Rome, and even when citizenship had been extended to the whole empire, some tribes, such as the Isaurians of Asia Minor, were still kept in obedience by the military power of the conquerors of the world. Coercion was not less a characteristic of the Habsburg Empire; the natives of America, and in some sense the

Dutch also, were regarded as unequal in rights to their Spanish rulers. Repression was not less apparent in France. In Canada and in Louisiana the French ruled, the American Indians obeyed. During the heyday of the Bourbon monarchy, the Huguenots were hardly better treated than were the peoples of the New World.

Nor does the British Empire afford an exception. Boasting of their free institutions, and boasting with no little justification, the English still refrain from according equal rights to all subjects of the crown. Millions of Indians, millions of negroes, are denied self-government. Immature graduates of Oxford University are held to be more capable of administration than men of the subject races, however wise and cultured. At least to a certain extent Aristotle's doctrine of the natural slave has been unconsciously adopted as the basic principle of the British Empire; imperialism, as ever, has implied coercion.

Even the white races have not been entirely freed from control. The crown colonies are governed more or less despotically; the vague shadow of representative government has not materialised. The Dominions themselves, practically independent as they are, possess no direct nifluence upon foreign relations, and the reten-

tion and exercise of an imperial veto serve to emphasise the conviction that the inhabitants of the British Isles are peculiarly fitted to determine the fate of peoples with whose circumstances and character they are at best only imperfectly acquainted. The English claim to be a race of rulers, and it is a strange anomaly that they seem, in the eyes of their compatriots, to lose their capacity for rule by residence beyond the sea, unless indeed it is their firm resolve to return home in due course.

Hostility to the principle of racial equality, indeed, has characterised every empire, every imperial people. If the degree of repression has varied greatly, repression has yet been always found. The very conception of imperialism seems to run counter to that of nationality; between the two ideas there appears to be a natural and inevitable conflict. Imperialism represents man's desire to dominate his fellows and to impose his will upon them; nationalism represents man's longing for independence and his willingness to concede to others the liberty which he himself enjoys. Wherever the nationalist principle has prevailed, an empire has been disrupted or at least embarrassed. Spanish world power was first impaired by the revolt of the Dutch; the

assertion of Magyar rights weakened the Austrian Habsburgs; the resolve of the Balkan peoples to be free overthrew Ottoman power in Europe. On almost every occasion when national claims have been vindicated, the result has been the erection of several small states in the place of one great power, and the exceptions presented by Germany and Italy are more apparent than real, since in each case heavy blows were struck at Austrian imperialism and since the new-formed monarchies have only been imperial in so far as they have denied the principle upon which they based their original claim to independent existence.

But since nationalism has been consistently hostile to imperialism, and since the present war involves the championship of nationalism, it would seem to follow as an inevitable consequence that the present war should lead to the disruption of empires. The allies are fighting for the liberty of the weak and oppressed, fighting the battle of the smaller nationalities. Their victory will necessarily be to some extent a defeat of the imperial idea, for in so far as imperialism implies coercion, the allies are anti-imperialist. And in so far as they are themselves guilty of coercion, they are guilty of that very fault which they propose to punish in the case of Germany and

Austria. Consistency demands that they should themselves abandon the policy of coercion, even if that abandonment involves loss to themselves. And at first sight, if England remains true to the cause for which she has taken up arms, if her conduct be sincere, then the war will lead to the disruption of the British Empire, no less than to the disruption of the empires of the Habsburgs and Hohenzollerns.

There is, however, a noteworthy difference between the British Empire and the empires of the past. Englishmen have always prided themselves upon their liberty; autocracy has always been alien to their spirit; they have never been markedly unwilling to concede a large measure of local freedom to their oversea possessions. The self-governing colonies are to all intents and purposes independent states. It is unthinkable that the error committed in the case of the American colonies should be repeated; it is unthinkable that any coercion of Australia or Canada should be attempted. The veto of the king in council is certainly maintained and exercised, but its exercise is in practice limited by considerations of prudence, nor would the veto be imposed in the case of any measure of which the passage was ardently desired by the

colonials. In the crown colonies, the permanent inhabitants have some share in the work of administration. Only in those districts where the natives are, or are supposed to be, incapable of self-government, is the British rule despotic. Even in these cases the despotism is tempered by publicity, by the fact that all acts of the executive may be called in question in the House of Commons, a body which never fails to contain some members resolved to check and to punish anything in the nature of oppression.

To a great extent, indeed, the British Empire, since the War of American Independence, has been explicitly based upon anti-imperial ideas. Imperialism implies the rule of a dominant race; that rule has been constantly limited. In Canada, the colonists of French blood have been admitted to an equality with those of English blood; loyalty has been secured by toleration and by the growth of mutual confidence; the path of coercion has been abandoned. In South Africa, the Boers were defeated, and their quasi-independent republics were destroyed. So far, the action of England was thoroughly imperialist. But when peace had been established, the principle of equal rights was once more asserted. Full self-government was accorded to the Dutch; in effect, the

conquering race submitted to be ruled by the conquered. Though there are subject races, Indians, negro tribes, American and Australasian aborigines, throughout the empire, these races are treated with far more consideration than are those peoples whose lot it is to be ruled by French or Germans, Spaniards, Dutch or Portuguese.

And this idea of assent, the conviction that government should be not only for the people, but also by the people, has gained ground in recent years. That pure imperialism which would create and maintain a *régime* of coercion has been more and more discredited. Protests against the grant of self-government to the Boers were numerous. They were disregarded, and their shortsightedness has been so generally recognised that those who protested would possibly be glad to unsay their words. In the case of India, there has been a growing tendency to admit a hitherto governed people to a greater share in political power. Fundamental differences in national character, serious divergences resulting from religious distinctions, the operation of the caste system, may well seem to render any great or complete grant of self-government an impossibility. But the principle that the Indians should have a voice in the decision of their own

fate has been explicitly accepted. The English claim no inherent right to rule India despotically; they profess to regard the element of despotism in their rule as a regrettable necessity. If to many the assertion that British rule has been established in India and elsewhere only from an altruistic desire to benefit the subject races seems both untrue and hypocritical, yet it has this practical effect, that it renders it impossible for England to establish or to maintain an arbitrary system of military government. There must be in all British possessions and dependencies at least a formal consideration for the well-being of the natives. Actions such as distinguished the rule of Leopold II. in the Congo are impossible within the limits of the British Empire.

There is, then, in the government of the British Empire a non-imperial element, non-imperial as imperialism is normally understood. And this fact has influenced and will influence still further the policy adopted during the present war. Undertaking a struggle for the deliverance of the oppressed, fighting against a would-be lord of the world, England has shown herself true to her professed principles. She has accepted the help offered to her by the Dominions, not on the ground that this help has been rendered in dis-

charge of an obligation, but as a favour received from a friend and equal.

But she has done much more than this. She has called the native troops of India to her aid. Hindus and Mohammedans are to fight side by side with the regiments of the United Kingdom and the contingents supplied by Canada, New Zealand and Australia. The equality of the Indians is admitted in a most emphatic manner; they are placed explicitly on a level with English soldiers. In the past, ruling races have from time to time employed the military forces of subject peoples. Frankish and Gothic auxiliaries fought in the armies of the Roman Empire; the French employed the natives of North America and the armies of Hyder Ali in India; the Austrians armed the Ruthenians against the revolted Poles of Galicia. But in all these cases the inferiority of subject races was still asserted; they were mere mercenaries used to fight the battles of their masters. There was no admission of equality.

But the present employment of Indian troops is on an entirely different footing; it cannot be paralleled in the past history of any empire. The Indians have come neither as mercenaries nor as slaves; they have come as the fellow-

subjects of those who have in the past uled them. Their presence on European battlefields is in itself a dramatic recognition of racial equality; it is opposed to all the old theories of imperialism; it is an innovation bound to produce vast results. By discharging willingly the duties, the Indians have established their claim to the rights of full citizenship. They thereby cease to be a subject race.

This, however, is a blow, and perhaps a fatal blow, to imperialism, as imperialism has been hitherto understood. Just as in the wars which followed the Reformation the fiction of a Europe united under a spiritual head was exploded, and as in the wars following upon the French Revolution the rule of the benevolent despot was discredited and for all practical purposes destroyed, so the present war will sweep into the limbo of the past the imperial ideas of the last century. The theory of the " white man's burden," in so far as that theory implies the exercise of despotic or paternal rule over non-white races, has been by implication rejected; it must soon be also rejected explicitly. Soldiers who can fight and die side by side cannot be widely differentiated from one another; a government which deliberately employs oriental troops in a European war

cannot deny the ultimate equality of oriental races. At the close of this present war the British Empire in India will cease to exist in the sense in which it has existed since the days of Clive and Warren Hastings.

Yet the very element of anti-imperialism which is present in the British Empire will preserve that empire from destruction. When all the vices of English rule have been admitted, it still remains an undeniable fact that this rule has devoted itself far less to the exploitation of subject races than has any other imperial government. It is no doubt true that the wealth of the United Kingdom has been largely increased as a result of the possession of oversea dominions; but this wealth has not been used with entire selfishness. In the old days of Spanish rule, the American colonies were regarded as valuable mainly as enabling impoverished Spanish grandees to reconstruct their fortunes. The pious declaration that Spain's great care was for the conversion of the natives hardly deceived even those who uttered it. A not dissimilar exploitation of the natives was to be found in India in the days of the Company; even at the present time, many hold that Indian economic policy is determined by the needs of the Lancashire cotton mills.

Nevertheless, it would be idle to deny that on the whole British rule in India has been directed to secure the greater welfare of the Indians.

Elsewhere, if the original possessors of the soil have been evicted, their eviction has been for the general good of mankind. The most ardent champion of the non-white races could hardly contend that the dispossession of such peoples as the Australian aborigines has not been for the advantage of the world at large. Imperialism has been tinged by a consciousness of the duty to rule well. England has annexed wide territories, and those territories have been administered by Englishmen. But British government has rarely, if ever, been openly defended on the plea that the English are natural rulers.

That recognition of racial equality which is involved by the present war will, therefore, be far less detrimental to the British Empire than to an empire more definitely organised upon an imperialist basis; the modification of policy will not amount to a revolution. The last traces of the older imperialism will pass away, but that imperialism has long been declining. The War of American Independence proved that it was inapplicable to men of English blood; the Canadian revolt warned the imperial government

to avoid the coercion of men of French extraction. In a certain sense, the Indian Mutiny taught the same lesson. Since that period, the tendency in India has been to give the former subject races an ever-increasing share in their own government. Racial equality, indeed, has not been fully admitted; the highest offices have hardly been opened to Indians. But there has been less insistence upon inequality; there has been an inclination to recognise and even to encourage the sentiment of nationality among the races of India.

The process which has thus been begun will be accelerated by the present war. Equality of the two races will be admitted in India, as it is being admitted on the battlefields of Europe. Mere necessity would compel such recognition. The former system of government rested upon moral force, upon the conviction in the minds of the Indians that they were natural subjects. But the East has shared in the general progress of the human race. Willingness to obey has decreased, and the discovery of some new basis for government would in any circumstances be essential. And the simultaneous modification of the British attitude towards subject races will effectively supply the new basis. Tolerance has

been learned; the rights of others have secured recognition. The alliance against Germany is based upon no other principle; and the same principle which inspired England to aid Belgium will determine the future government of the empire. The policy, already adopted with success in South Africa, will be applied to India also.

It may be admitted that the recognition of nationality in India and the application of self-government must be at best only partial. India is not a land of one race but of many; the various peoples have little sympathy with one another, and the Mohammedan minority would be reluctant to accept the rule of the Hindu majority. The difficulty is obvious and great; its solution is, however, not impossible. The experience of joint service in the field will serve to bring the Indian races together, as joint service brought the German peoples together during the Napoleonic wars. The growth of toleration will complete the work; harmony will be attained by realisation of the evils of strife. The process may be slow, but it will be effective.

The Indians, however, are not the only subject peoples of the British Empire. In Africa and Polynesia there are millions of non-whites, whose nationality is real if unappreciated even by them-

selves, whose rights are inalienable though generally ignored. It may appear, indeed, to be impossible to entrust negroes with powers of government; all white races have hitherto agreed that the black races must be ruled. The American constitution declares that no one shall be excluded from the exercise of the franchise by reason of colour; the negroes are none the less practically excluded from all political rights in those states in which they are numerically powerful. Even some of the firmest champions of the negro cause have held that the black races are unfitted for the work of government. Many have pointed to the anarchic condition of the negro republics, and have argued that the true destiny of the African races is employment in subordinate though honourable positions. In face of so strong a conviction, it is clear that admission of equality in the black races is impossible for the moment. Yet the spirit of toleration here also will have its effect. Prejudice based upon difference of colour will decline; educational efforts will be directed to fit the negroes for the performance of the duties of citizens that they may also enjoy the rights.

In short, free assent will become the basis of the British Empire. If, for the present, English-

men will continue to hold the more responsible positions, that will be due to the fact that the other races, long habituated to subjection, and at present incapable of rule, accept direction with readiness. Such acceptance will not be permanent. As a man wearies of control and yearns in time to assert his liberty, so a race likewise wearies. National development produces unrest; gradually free assent will no longer be given to the holding of all the greater positions by men of an alien race. As in Europe the present war will end German and Magyar rule over Slavs and Roumans, so it will lead ultimately to the end of British rule over Indians and negroes.

The day is not now far distant when the self-governing colonies will cast away the few remaining traces of their subjection to the imperial parliament. They will demand an active share in the control of imperial policy; they will refuse to risk being drawn into disputes by the adoption of a policy not previously approved by themselves. Equality is already recognised; it will become still more real. That the war will produce this result has been generally foreseen. It has perhaps been less generally recognised that the races of India will pursue the same course and that they also will demand a preponderating

voice in their own government, a share in the direction of the British Empire. "India for the Indians" will cease to be merely the cry of a few disappointed politicians; it will become the recognised policy of England, and in place of rule by civilians from England there will be rule of India by her own people.

Thus the British Empire, as at present constituted, will cease to exist. Imperialism, implying coercion, will cease to be a living creed. In place of an empire ruled by an executive supplied by the British Isles, there will be created a federation of closely allied, but independent, states. A central parliament representative of the whole empire is an obvious impossibility. Considerations of distance alone would defeat this idea; numerical difficulties vitiate the entire proposal. But representatives of the Dominions and of India, resembling ambassadors of allied states, can and will assemble in London, sharing in the direction of foreign policy and deciding all matters which are not of merely local importance and interest.

The war, indeed, while destroying the present character of the empire, will produce a new and more real unity. The rally of the colonies and of India to the aid of Great Britain is no triumph

for that imperialism which would establish the English race as a dominant ruling people. On the contrary, to that imperialism it deals a staggering and fatal blow. Yet the empire will not be destroyed. It will be given a new and firmer basis, by the admission of racial equality, by the granting of equal rights to all the peoples of that empire. A predominant influence will doubtless long be exercised by the Anglo-Saxon race, since that race established the empire and since it is characterised by a political sense which has been developed through the centuries. But the influence will be that of guidance rather than of command. And affording a striking example of the possibility of dominion based upon assent, the British Empire will henceforward be, as it has been in the past, as it has been in the case of Belgium, the foe of oppression and the friend of liberty and justice.

V

INTERNAL POLITICS IN ENGLAND

THROUGHOUT history, in every state which has adopted representative institutions, political parties have also been formed. The legislative assembly has been the scene of more or less violent debates; unanimity of opinion has never been permanently secured, nor have the occasional suggestions for the elimination of party borne fruit. And this political phenomenon may be readily explained. Divisions of party are the direct product of human nature; they are the expression of that conflict which determines the conduct of each individual. Searching for happiness, men waver between the two alternative paths which may be pursued. The whole body of citizens equally so wavers, and the imperfection of human nature leads to the adoption of extreme views, to intolerance and to bitter conflict.

But party divisions have in the past appeared to be necessary for the well-being of the state. Unhampered by the curb of opposition, govern-

ment would seem to tend towards tyranny; representative institutions would seem to be unreal if the executive were unchecked by the presence in the legislative body of a minority eager to overthrow the existing rulers. If the establishment of arbitrary power did not ensue, it would be only that the dominant party itself split into factions. No body of men, however sincerely they may be agreed upon broad principles, can be entirely agreed upon details, and a political party is preserved from vigorous disputes upon minor points only by the need of unity in face of a common enemy. In England, after the accession of George I., the Tory party for a while practically ceased to exist. Forthwith the victorious Whigs quarrelled among themselves; ministers were opposed and defeated by the malcontents of their own party. In France, after the establishment of the Third Republic, the Chamber was filled with members professedly agreed, devoted to the maintenance of the new *régime*. But harmony among them was short-lived; factions, violently hostile to one another, soon appeared, and unanimity gave place to division. The very completeness of a great political triumph seems in the past to have produced defeat; relieved from external danger, a party becomes

careless of its unity and forthwith splits up into groups antagonistic to one another.

Such has been the history of parties in the past, and there may be little cause for supposing that their future history will be materially different. The calamities inseparable from the present war will effect a modification of human nature, but there is no ground for thinking that this modification will involve complete unanimity of opinion. The existence of such unanimity indeed would be a disaster. Man is distinguished from the brute creation by the possession of reason; debate, the exercise of the reasoning faculties, invigorates the mind, and it is from the vigorous mentality of the prophets and teachers of the past that all which is best in the world has been derived. If debate ceased, mentality would decline; men would become intellectually sluggish and the race forthwith deteriorate. But identity of opinion would silence debate, which would clearly be rendered impossible, and the world, so far from profiting from the lessons of the present war, would suffer even greater evils from peace than it has endured through strife.

There is, however, a wide difference between complete identity of opinion and violent conflict; there is a mean between these two extremes in

which the highest good may be found. And towards that mean the race will now be guided. War is the most extreme expression of difference of opinion; its evils will be more fully appreciated as a result of present misery, and the appreciation of the demerits of one extreme will suggest the demerits of all extremes. Men will not learn to agree completely with their fellows; they will learn a far more valuable and beneficial lesson. They will learn to respect those from whom they differ; they will learn to tolerate. And just as the truest union between individuals is founded rather upon an appreciated diversity than upon unanimity, so the truest union in the state, the surest means for the avoidance of conflict and for the attainment of the highest happiness, will be found in mutual toleration, in mutual respect for divergence of opinion. Political parties will not cease to exist, but they will cease to differ with that violence and animosity which have characterised them in the past.

For the growth of political violence has been one of the salient characteristics of English politics in recent years. There was a time, and that time not so far distant, when the contending parties in the state agreed in respecting each other, in crediting each other with sincerity and

honesty of purpose, even while they asserted that erroneous opinions were held by their opponents. This mutual respect has now largely disappeared. Each party has accused the other of political dishonesty, of pandering to the prejudices of the few or of the many, of being guided by no higher principle than self-interest. And the causes of this increased violence may be found in the growth of the professional politician, the development of the party machine, and the influence of the press.

Originally it was a characteristic of English politics that the members of parliament were generally amateurs, men who entered the political arena as a pastime, who neither expected nor desired to profit materially from their public work. From the period when a wave of political purity extinguished first the direct system of bribery, and then the less direct corruption by means of sinecure offices, membership of the House of Commons was expensive and afforded little prospect of gain. The comparatively large salaries of cabinet ministers, even, rarely compensated office-holders for the loss of income involved in the adoption of a political career, and it was true that men possessing enough ability to attain to cabinet rank would have been capable of securing far more lucrative employ-

ment in other fields of human activity. Membership of parliament was indeed valued, but valued for social and sentimental rather than for pecuniary reasons.

But gradually a change came over the House of Commons. The multiplication of officials seemed to promise material advantages to the supporters of the ministry for the time being; men began to enter into politics as a means of advancing themselves in some other form of employment; a class of professional politicians arose. These men, however, were generally neither willing nor able to wait long for the anticipated reward; they viewed with anger, not unmingled with fear, the long continuance of an opposing party in office; they were almost feverishly anxious to render some signal service to their own party, and so to merit recognition. Disappointment produced bitterness; party methods became less scrupulous, and the attacks delivered upon ministers were marked by a venom unknown in the past.

Nor was it the professional politicians alone who contributed to this result. The nineteenth century saw increasing specialisation in every direction, and consequently increased organisation. Haphazard methods which had answered

well enough in an earlier period were now regarded as inadequate. The machinery of politics became more complete and efficient, until it has gradually become impossible for a man to secure election, or even re-election, without the assistance of party organisation. As a natural consequence, the independent member has tended to disappear; any indication of a readiness to follow the guidance of conviction rather than the directions of the party whips has been normally followed by the rejection of so self-willed a member in his constituency. Support from the party machine having become almost essential, members have tended to strive more and more to conciliate the organisers upon whom they depend. They have laboured to prove that they were good party men, and have found the most convenient method of proof in violence of language, in vigorous accusation, and sustained vituperation. Not willingly would they give cause to doubt their righteous hatred of their opponents.

And the control of the party machine has been extended also to the press. In the reign of Victoria, some newspapers at least retained a large measure of independence. Competition, however, has had its inevitable result. Need for attracting readers, and hence advertisers,

has led the press generally to pander to the taste of the many, and since violence and sensationalism are obviously more attractive than a cold and considered judgment, the *mot d'ordre* for journalists has tended to be, "A sensation every day and at all costs." Extreme views have become the rule rather than the exception; violent abuse or fulsome adulation of public characters has marked those papers which have secured the widest circulation. Ministers have been accused of the blackest crimes against the nation, the grossest direliction of duty. To impute treasonable motives to opponents has become a mere commonplace in the party press. And the attitude of the press has served to influence members of parliament; they have repeated in the House the assertions of the journalists, and the unsupported diatribes of irresponsible leader writers have inspired the perfervid speeches of alleged statesmen.

Yet the nation has not been wholly convinced by the violence of partisans; that violence has not failed to produce a reaction. And this reaction will be intensified by the present war. The development of the party machine, the rise of the professional politician, have been made possible by the existence of a spirit of intolerance.

But intolerance has tended to defeat its own object; the very violence of partisanship has tended to draw attention to the folly of the partisans. Hostility to the domination of the press appeared in the Liberal victory following upon the resignation of the Balfour ministry. The majority of newspapers agreed in declaring that a Conservative defeat would mean the practical ruin of the Empire; the majority of the electorate agreed in disregarding the assertions of the press.

Violence, however, has continued to characterise party politics. Neither party has exhibited tolerance. The abuse of ministers has been effectively paralleled in ministerial abuse of the supporters of their opponents. Opposition has become factious; measures have been opposed not by means of reasoned amendment, but by means of wholesale and extravagant condemnation. The acts of the government have been condemned without qualification; they have been declared to be the product of political immorality. Ministers have been accused of an entire lack of sincerity; it has been taken as a matter of course by their opponents that they are in the pay of the enemies of their country. Epithets such as "liar" and "traitor" have

been bandied to and fro with little hesitation, and an intelligent foreigner, attending a debate in the House of Commons or reading the columns of the party press, might be excused if he concluded that the members of the British Parliament were deliberately selected from the criminal classes. Nor has the violence ended in a mere wordy warfare. Resistance to law has been openly preached. One section of the press has hailed as true patriots those who have refused to obey acts of parliament, nor is there any shorter avenue to an heroic reputation than to adopt an attitude of more or less active rebellion.

It is impossible that such violent discussions should be barren of result. Abuse, having largely taken the place of debate, and having passed all reasonable limits, has begun to bear fruit in action. The dominant party has been socially ostracised. Membership of the Liberal party has been regarded as a barrier against social intercourse, a barrier more real and more effective than the commission of serious moral offences. But such insistence upon political differences can produce only one result. The lesson of the French Revolution stands clear to be read by all. Monarchy and aristocracy were overthrown very largely because the real or alleged leaders of

society refused to associate with the bourgeoisie. To a philosopher it may be a small matter that he is ignored by some aristocratic dullard. But few men, and fewer women, are philosophers, nor are there any slights which so rankle and so inspire to revenge as those suffered in the course of social life. England was trembling on the verge of revolution. Class hatred was growing, violence increasing. For the first time for many years, the mutterings of political discontent were assuming a dangerous tone; it was openly declared that since one party laboured to rally to its side all the influence of monarchy and aristocracy, the other party would away with the institutions of centuries, away with the classes which affected an attitude of superiority.

From this catastrophe England has been saved by a catastrophe hardly less great. Nothing, perhaps, save a general European war could have served to prevent the translation of violent speech into violent action. But the war will so serve; it will accomplish that which statesmanship could not avail to effect. Face to face with all the miseries of so vast a conflict, both parties have realised, as in a lightning flash, the littleness of their own conduct. With the existence of the nation at stake, the existence of a particular

party becomes a detail so trivial as hardly to merit consideration. With death threatening all, the outlook of mankind becomes enlarged; each individual is able to view life as if from some external standpoint, to appreciate in their true proportion both events and measures. His imagination is at once aroused and sobered. He grasps something of the immensity of world problems; he realises his own insignificance, and by realisation learns to refrain from hasty judgment, learns to consider the position of others, to be tolerant.

Of this modification in human nature, of this development of toleration, signs have already appeared in the political world. The outbreak of war found parliament divided into two bitterly hostile camps; civil war was openly declared to be possible or probable, the treason of ministers was the favourite theme with members of the opposition. At no recent period of English history had so great violence characterised political life, at no time had personal hostility between party leaders or divergence between classes appeared so distinctly. But at the declaration of war all this was changed. Party divisions were obliterated; the leaders of the official opposition vied with the Labour members and the Nationalists in the cordiality with which

they supported the government. Such measures as were needed for meeting the crisis were passed unanimously and by acclamation; supplies were granted with rapidity and willingness.

Nothing of the kind had been seen before in the history of parliament. In all previous wars in which England has been engaged, there have always been numerous sympathisers with the enemy. The Tories under Anne vigorously opposed the policy of intervention in the War of the Spanish Succession. Chatham "rejoiced that America had resisted"; the war against the revolted colonists was never popular. Fox and Sheridan openly sympathised with the ideals of revolutionary France, and their supporters were numerous enough to render repressive legislation an apparent necessity. During the Crimean War and the Boer War, the temptation to snatch party advantages was not resisted. It may be argued that the danger is now greater and more obvious; yet the danger was great enough when Napoleon had conquered Europe and when his armies were assembled at Boulogne. Nor can the present unanimity be attributed solely to the fact that the justice of the allied cause is palpably obvious. The ultimate reason lies deeper; it is to be found in the foundations of human nature. Uncon-

sciously, men have wearied of violence and intolerance; unconsciously they have long been seeking an excuse for moderation. The spirit of toleration has made silent, but not the less consistent, progress; the changing nature of man has been revealed clearly by the stress of a great crisis.

Nor will this new spirit of toleration enjoy merely a transitory ascendancy. Those grave charges which have been so lightly brought against ministers can never be repeated; the most violent partisan will no longer be able to declare his belief in the treason of those men who have guided their country through the present dangers. The opposition cannot henceforth be denied the credit due to their undoubted patriotism; the Nationalists can no longer be charged with a desire to deliver Ireland into the hands of the enemies of England; the Labour party cannot be identified with anti-patriotic propaganda. All parties will be forced henceforward to recognise the merit of their opponents. Individuals are ever drawn together by sharing the same misfortune, by being involved in some common danger. Being so drawn together, they learn to realise the good, to overlook the evil, in one another; they learn toleration. The same lesson will be learned by political parties in Eng-

land. Faced by a great danger, which they have met and which they will overcome in common, they will the better understand one another, the better appreciate different points of view. To the recent reign of violence a reign of tolerance will succeed.

The war, indeed, has opened a new era in politics. In the extreme sense, party government will almost cease to exist. Though division of opinion will continue, and though there will be no actual end of party, that violence and factiousness which have marked recent years will disappear. Recognition of sincerity in opponents will be the rule rather than the exception; it will be the more general since it will also be more truly present. For the violent professional politician there will be no place; neither parliament nor the constituencies will for ever agree to the perpetration of absurdities, and accusations of treason and of similar crimes based upon mere difference of political opinion are an absurdity.

But to the existence of the professional politician the violence of party politics must be mainly attributed; his disappearance can only lead to a greater degree of toleration, as it will indeed be caused by a growth of toleration. And since he must be replaced, the new type of member can

be found only in the man of more independent views. The nominee of the party caucus will no longer be the most acceptable candidate. His acceptability has depended generally upon his political orthodoxy, upon his willingness to engage in violent opposition, even upon a certain lack of scrupulousness. Violence being discredited, the strong party man will possess far lower worth. And the strong party man being no longer favoured, his place being taken by men of wider views and greater toleration, the power and influence of party organisation will be undermined; the days of strict control will pass, and liberty will be restored to the House of Commons through the medium of the present war, as it will be preserved to the continent of Europe.

From this one obvious result will follow. In recent years, it has been largely possible to coerce minorities by means of the mechanical majority possessed by the ministry of the day. Fear of the consequences of a quarrel with the central office of the party, knowledge that re-election would be well-nigh impossible save through the support of the party machine, has been sufficient to deter members from voting against their leaders, at least in any very critical division. The dominant party has thus been able to

trample upon the minority. Debate has been curtailed; concessions have been refused; a victory at the polls has been pushed to its extreme conclusion.

And this has been more the case owing to the fact that each party has consistently denied the sincerity of the other, has consistently claimed for itself the monopoly of political virtue, and hence has feared stultification if it has made any concessions. If a ministry has abated any considerable part of its original demands, the opposition have forthwith accused it of having confessed the iniquity of its whole policy. If the opposition have admitted the excellence of any part of the ministerial programme, they have forthwith been accused of factiousness in their resistance to the other items of that programme. Violence has begotten violence; extreme views have led to greater extremes. Intolerance having secured an ascendancy, toleration has been hailed as weakness, has become almost impossible.

But the majority of all parties, whether in the House or in the constituencies, has perhaps generally recognised the futility of bigoted partisanship, has longed to return to a saner position. The present war affords the desired opportunity. Teaching all parties to recognise merit in their

opponents, that merit being publicly proclaimed in the press, toleration has at last become possible. Concessions to a minority will no longer be regarded as proof of weakness or of insincerity; the minority will no longer believe, or profess to believe, that the possession of a numerical majority is incompatible with the possession of common honesty. Members, convinced of the value of toleration, crediting their opponents with some political virtue, freed from the arbitrary control of the party caucus, will become more independent and will be ready to resist the dictation of the party whips. That readiness will serve to restrain oppressive legislation; measures will be conceived with more regard for those who are in opposition to them. Divergence of opinion being respected, statesmanship will triumph over partisanship; though political parties will continue to exist, legislation will more and more assume a national and non-party character.

This result, proceeding largely from the changed character of members, will serve to emphasise that change. The demand of the constituencies will be for men of sincerity and tolerance; candidates will be compelled to possess the qualities demanded, as they have been compelled hitherto

to possess the quality of party loyalty in an extreme form. They will be driven to moderation, as they have been driven to violence, but moderation will already be acceptable to them, since the evils of violence will have become apparent.

They will be equally forced to give a more genuine consideration to the wishes and needs of the people at large. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the desires and opinions of the many were almost deliberately disregarded by parliament; prohibition of the reporting of debates was defended on the very ground that their publication would make members accountable to their constituents. The decline of the feudal spirit, following upon great economic changes, drove the ruling class to the conciliation of the ruled. Though some still attempted to preserve an attitude of olympian detachment, the majority in both parties proclaimed their devotion to the welfare of the many, soliciting votes, not as being natural rulers but as being the servants of the people. The service was dubiously sincere; the people were rather exploited for the benefit of the classes from which members of parliament were drawn, and the evolution of the Labour party suggested that the many were not blind to the truth. But this exploitation has been possible

mainly owing to the strength of party organisation. With the decline of the caucus it will become more difficult, with the development of sincerity it will become impossible, with the growth of toleration, and hence of true sympathy, it will no longer be attempted or desired. Government will be truly for the people.

Government will also be by the people. Whatever may be asserted as to the growth of democracy in England, it is still true to-day, no less than it has been true in the past, that there is a governing class. The majority of members of parliament have been drawn from the wealthier classes, from those who are able to make it worth the while of the local association to select them, of the central office to support them. Efficient party organisation demands constant funds. Seats are consequently bought at the present day, perhaps less openly, but hardly less certainly, than they were in the period prior to the Reform Act and the Corrupt Practices Act.

With the decline of party organisation, however, the expenses of candidature and of membership will be alike reduced; a parliamentary career will be open to larger numbers, and the present ruling class will be deprived of the basis of their power. Merit will be a better recom-

mendation than wealth. And men of merit will be the more attracted to parliament since, as members, they will no longer be the slaves of party whips, almost unable to speak or vote save as party considerations demand.

The same result will be hastened by the very growth of toleration. Mutual distrust and jealousy between classes will decline, each having learned the better qualities of the other. In the present war, men of all classes are to be found alike among the officers and in the rank and file, non-commissioned officers have been promoted and will be promoted in increasing numbers; members of those classes from which officers have normally been drawn have enlisted and will enlist in the ranks. The result can only be a great weakening of class distinctions. Familiarity will breed not contempt but a fuller sympathy; the former rulers will learn the merit of service, the former subjects will attain capacity for rule. Realising that it has no monopoly of capacity for government, the ruling class will also cease to desire any such monopoly.

England has often been described as a veiled republic; all that is most valuable in the republican spirit will be developed by this war. The duty of the rich to consider the poor, the

duty of the poor to realise that wealth is not necessarily ill-gotten and that capital has its part to play in the work of production, will be alike realised and performed. Class distinctions, class hatred, the snobbery of birth and wealth, of intellect and of poverty, will tend to pass away, and the English people, refined in the fire of a life and death conflict, will enter upon a new era of mutual tolerance, of greater sympathy, and of truer liberty.

VI

INTERNAL POLITICS IN OTHER COUNTRIES

When many individuals are involved in some common calamity, they are all affected by it, but to a different extent and in different ways, owing to divergences of character and temperament. One is exalted and refined by misfortune, another is driven to despair. One is subjected to an enduring influence; another, more volatile, easily forgets the past and readily resumes his normal habit of life. Between nations there are divergences as great as between individuals; differences of national character, indeed, are generally better appreciated than are the somewhat more subtle differences between members of the same race. Thus, though the present war will affect all nations, its influence will vary somewhat both in depth and extent, owing to the existence of varying national characteristics and institutions. While the general ultimate result will be similar in every case, the immediate results will be dissimilar.

The nature of that general result can be clearly

foreseen. The victory of the allies will be the victory of toleration, involving the application of the principle of free assent to the relations of state with state. The same principle will be applied also to internal affairs. The false opinion that the true basis of international relations is, and can only be, a sentiment of hostility will be dissipated; there will no longer be blind submission to some supposed law of necessity. The former imperial idea of government will vanish with the recognition of nationality. Authority will be based upon reasoned popular approval; in every state the people themselves will rule.

Hitherto, though representative institutions have in theory been almost universally established, government has rested with a ruling class rather than with the many. A more or less militarist *régime* has been generally accepted, submission to such a *régime* being supposed to be the only means by which national existence could be preserved or national progress made possible. In the German Empire especially, this system has prevailed; the Prussian military caste has ruled almost despotically. Their government has been ultimately based upon the acceptance of a false theory of international politics; it has led to the adoption of a faulty foreign policy.

Germany has become involved in an attempt to secure a predominant position in Europe and in the world by means of a war of aggression. That aggression will be unsuccessful, and the attempt to establish a practical hegemony will result in disaster for the German Empire, as similar attempts have resulted in disaster for other states in the past.

Forthwith, the ascendancy of a ruling class, and more particularly of a military ruling class, will be everywhere discredited. The masses will no longer admit the necessity for a system which they have always hated; the end for which that system was created will not have been attained even by the state which had adopted it most thoroughly, for it will not avail to save Germany from defeat and Prussia from humiliation. The way will be thus prepared for the adoption of a different system of government; the doctrine of free assent will win adherents and the victory of toleration will be ensured. Already there has appeared an ever-increasing disbelief in the prevalent theory of international politics and all which that theory implies; the present war will increase that disbelief until it amounts to certainty of past error, and will thereby hasten the triumph of less cynical principles.

That triumph will be largely unopposed. Experience of the calamities of war will teach a lesson even to those states which are not themselves belligerent; the evils of conflict will be better realised, and the evils of that intolerance from which all conflict arises better understood. The spirit of toleration will develop, and with it a desire to understand others; sympathy will be deepened. But it is to lack of sympathy that the desire of one class to dominate must be mainly attributed; when class desires to understand class, hatred and jealousy between them naturally disappear. Popular government in the truest sense is the inevitable consequence. There will be neither rule of the few by the many, nor of the many by the few; there will be neither rule of the rich by the poor, nor of the poor by the rich. Class distinctions will cease to be of political importance; mutual toleration will secure that which it alone can secure, the establishment of government based upon the sympathetic co-operation of all sections of the community. Violent strife will cease at home no less than abroad; to an era of open or concealed conflict there will succeed an era of peace.

Such internal peace has often been impaired, and even rendered impossible, by the strife of

nationalities. But the present war will end in the acceptance of nationality as the broad basis of international society, and its acceptance will react upon internal politics. A cause, and perhaps the most potent cause, of strife will be removed. In the past, a great crisis has often drawn together hostile parties or races within a country, as it has drawn together rival states. Maria Theresa, threatened by Frederic the Great, appealed with success to the very Magyars who had long and bitterly opposed Habsburg rule. After Jena, the dominant Prussian aristocracy won generous support from the peasantry whom they had oppressed. But in each case, and in many other like cases, the alliance was only temporary; when the crisis was passed, old antipathies revived.

Their revival was due to the repression of nationalism and to the absence of toleration. The Magyars were actuated less by any liking for the Habsburgs than by hostility to the Hohenzollerns; the Prussian peasantry were moved less by affection for the nobles than by loathing for the French. Each alliance was based upon hatred rather than upon love; having attained its immediate object, it naturally dissolved. Yet neither would have dissolved if

the German element in the Austrian dominions had learned to appreciate the Magyar standpoint, if the Prussian aristocracy had been moved sincerely to consider the claims and to redress the grievances of the peasants. Neither would have been temporary, if the dominant party had been less intolerant, if it had been more ready to consider the claims and opinions of others. They were shattered by lack of toleration, of any desire to attain a true union of hearts.

At the present moment, those causes which have hitherto rendered alliances between rulers and ruled, or between races acknowledging some common ruler, imperfect and transitory are at least less operative. The factors which make for the permanence of such alliances are more potent. Nationality has in a measure been accepted as a principle of policy; its fuller acceptance will follow upon the victory of the allies. One great source of conflict will be thus removed; nationalities will be no longer repressed, no longer driven to fight for recognition. At the same time, the growth of toleration will serve to destroy the desire of one race or of one class to possess domination, as it will destroy the desire of one state to possess domination. The root of strife is intolerance; that root will be destroyed.

Having experienced calamities far greater than any which have yet befallen it, the world will profit from that experience. Ardently desirous that strife, whether between states or between parties within a state, should cease, mankind will learn at last the means by which peace may be attained. The merit of toleration, the blessedness of sympathy, will be appreciated, and though differences of opinion will still exist, they will be tempered by a spirit of moderation; they will no longer lead to violent conflict, but will rather supply the basis of a deeper and truer unity.

In all countries the same lesson will be learned, the same ultimate result will be produced. But it is clear that the immediate effects will vary in different lands. The states which remain neutral will, at least for a while, be less affected than those which are belligerent. They will have a slighter appreciation of the principles and issues involved; they will experience the evils of conflict less acutely, and be proportionately less convinced of the necessity for rooting out the seed of strife. The lessons of the war will be learned more slowly, the revolution in their system of government will be more gradual. And the extent of the change produced by the war will vary also according to the nature of the existing

institutions of each state. Those which have given themselves over to the dominion of a ruling class will be more deeply influenced than those in which popular government is already established. That which in the first will be revolution, in the second will be little more than normal development.

Thus France after the war will be little different from the France of yesterday. The general framework of her existing government will be preserved; the changes resulting will be akin to those which will occur in England. The violence of party politics will be minimised. At present, in France, more than in any other land, political differences are a bar to social intercourse. Now men of all parties are facing death together in a common cause, a better understanding must result. That intolerance which has dictated policy will fade away; toleration will take its place. As in England, the professional politician will lose his ascendancy: statesmanship will be substituted for partisanship as the motive for legislation. There will be a change, and a profound change, in the spirit of French politics, but the Republic will not be endangered; it will rather secure a greater vitality and permanence.

On the other hand, in Russia the results of the

war will be obviously more far-reaching, obviously more dramatic. Yet though a revolution will occur, it will be a peaceful revolution. In a sense, indeed, it has already been accomplished. The war has united all the peoples of the Russian Empire as they have never before been united. The Poles have responded loyally to the call to arms; the Finns have forgotten the long political persecution to which they have been subjected. The Teutonic colonies in the interior have petitioned that they may be allowed to abandon the epithet "German," which they have hitherto borne with pride; the Jews, long subjected to torture, physical and mental, have joined wholeheartedly in the common cause. A new spirit pervades the Russian Empire.

Small incidents really afford a better indication of the popular mind than do the grave declarations of statesmen and the manifestoes of political parties. One such incident vividly illustrates the growth of toleration in Russia. As her troops entered Galicia, officers and men, Orthodox though they were, asked and received the blessings of Catholic priests; those who sought and those who gave forgot their differences of belief, remembered only that they were united in a great crusade for liberty. But of all forms of toleration,

religious toleration is most hard to attain. Men who feel strongly the truth of their own creed almost naturally incline to regard those who adhere to another Church as the enemies of God. The Russians are emphatically a religious race. It has been contended with some plausibility that an appeal to their religious enthusiasm is the one appeal which they never hear unmoved; since the days of Ivan the Terrible, they have fought the battle of the Cross against the Crescent. If religious toleration has made progress with them, other forms of toleration will assuredly make progress also, and with such progress comes political liberty. The hopes that Russian liberals and the more acute observers of the Russian people have freely expressed since the present war began will not be falsified by any intolerance on the part of the Slav race.

Nor will the ruling class attempt resistance. They will rather favour the new movement. Despite its faults and despite the crimes of which it has been guilty, the government of Nicholas II. has at least become a modified autocracy; the mere institution of the Duma marked the abandonment of absolutism pure and simple. Gradually, a more liberal spirit has begun to pervade the administration, and if, even at the present

moment, many political exiles are denied the privilege of assisting their country, there have not been lacking signs that the government is ready to make amends. Justice has been promised to the Poles; those exiles who have returned have not met with the punishment which a strict interpretation of the law would involve. Even the vigour of Russian hatred towards Germany suggests the approaching establishment of greater liberty at home. The humiliation of Prussia will react upon internal politics, and will facilitate the sweeping away for ever of that Teutonic domination under which Russia has so long groaned and from which she has endured so much misery. The way is indeed opened for the Slavs to realise their destiny. Petersburg has become Petrograd in name; it cannot be doubted that it will so become in spirit.

And history suggests the probability of a peaceful revolution in Russia. There are numerous instances of a successful struggle against attempted domination culminating in the development of internal liberty within those states by which the aggressor has been thwarted. The Italian cities, having defeated Frederic Barbarossa, were organised on a more democratic basis. The Dutch overcame Philip II., and in

the United Provinces republicanism gained a triumph over the attempted monarchism of the House of Orange. The revolt of the South German states against Napoleon was followed by the introduction of a liberal spirit into their administration. If, upon occasion, such victories have served merely to confirm despotism, this has not occurred when the people have taken their share in the war freely and consciously. It has been the result of such wars as have in reality been forced upon the nation by some dominant caste, when the people have been deceived and have been inspired only by some sentiment of obedience, or when external pressure has prevented the natural development of the victorious state.

In Russia, the present war is emphatically a people's war; it has gained the cordial support of the very men who might have been expected to seize the occasion to embarrass a government from which they have received little good, to the principles and methods of which they have been consistently opposed. It is certain enough that no external influence will be exerted to prevent the growth of liberty. Rather, the mere fact that Russia is allied with England and France is a potential guarantee that her institutions will

be more closely conformed to those of her allies. England has never, France but rarely, been deaf to the appeals of the weak and oppressed; both have risked something and have suffered much in the cause of liberty. The Russian people are fighting for the cause of freedom; when victory has been gained, the Slavs will share in that liberty, for the sake of which they have ever been willing to die and for the sake of which they now endure that they may also conquer.

Upon Austria-Hungary and upon Germany the immediate effects of the conflict will be more profound, productive of more striking changes. The most noteworthy feature of the internal organisation of the Dual Monarchy is the Germano-Magyar alliance, the league between two dominant races to repress and to hold in subjection the other peoples of the Habsburg dominions. If this system has hardly attained a large measure of success, it has at least subsisted; discontent, however prevalent, has at least not culminated in actual revolution.

Two factors have contributed to produce this result. Of all European states, Austria-Hungary has been least affected by those political or mental revolutions which have disturbed the continent. A repressive system has been generally main-

tained, and has been, on the whole, little resisted. Austria has possessed one reforming ruler, Joseph II.; his methods were autocratic to a degree, and his attitude towards his subjects is effectively illustrated by his treatment of the Bohemian deists, who were whipped "because they claimed to be something which they did not comprehend." Joseph's successors have not even attempted to be benevolent despots. Alike at home and abroad, they have been devoted to the preservation of the *status quo*, and such changes as have occurred have resulted not from any change in the spirit of the government, but from the operation of vigorous popular discontent.

But since no system of government can be maintained save by the assent, active or passive, of the subjects, the mere fact that arbitrary or semi-arbitrary rule has so long continued in Austria-Hungary suggests, and even proves, that the subjects of the Habsburgs have been and are habituated to submission. Their political sense has been deadened by centuries of repression, and they have therefore been less susceptible to the influences which have moved other nations. Their minds have been saturated with the spirit of submission; they have hardly thought of desiring or of demanding power to rule themselves.

Even if they had so desired, their expression of their desire would in all probability have been prevented by supposed necessity. Austria-Hungary is a haphazard collection of territories, united by a series of political accidents. War and marriage, and more especially the latter, have increased the originally scanty Habsburg domains; birth and death seem to have conspired through the ages to augment the possessions of that " fortunate " family. Hence any change has seemed to threaten the dissolution of an empire, a large part of which appears more properly to belong to other states.

The dominant peoples in the Dual Monarchy have realised this danger of disruption; they have consented to the existing *régime* from fear that its destruction might entail worse evils than its maintenance. Germans and Magyars have hated each other; they have feared as well as hated the Slavs, since the might of Russia has ever loomed in the political background, seeming to threaten common subjection to the Tsar as the penalty for the gratification of mutual dislike. And the Slavs themselves, uncertain of the treatment which they would receive at the hands of a conquering Russia, mistrustful of their own capacity for standing alone, permeated with that

pessimism which has been characteristic of their race, have endured domination, waiting for that day when their brothers across the Danube should be able to effect their deliverance. The custom of centuries and dread of the future have served to hold revolution and the desire for liberty in check.

Yet in Austria-Hungary, as in every other state, government must at least justify itself in the opinion of the political majority. Though the passive assent of subjects is sufficient to prevent revolution, that assent must yet be given permanently, and it will not be so given unless government fulfils at least its most elementary function. Protection must be accorded; the independence of the state must be preserved; foreign conquest must be prevented. So long as they could afford such protection, the Habsburgs at least supplied a potential justification of their rule; failing to supply it, there remains no possible excuse for a system which consists in little more than the denial to many races of any trace of national existence. The defeat of the Habsburgs in the present war is certain; it is not doubtful that the defeat will be decisive. Their system will be discredited and will fall, and by its fall it will at last secure the triumph of political liberty in the Dual Monarchy.

But political liberty in Austria-Hungary, to an even greater extent than elsewhere, implies nationalism. In so heterogeneous a state there can be no change which will not involve partial, if not entire, disruption. The rule of Germans and Magyars will assuredly be ended; Slavs, Roumans and Italians can no longer be kept in subjection. It may be doubtful whether or no the name of Austria-Hungary will continue to figure on the map of Europe. Yet even if it does so figure, the victory of the allies will involve changes greater and more violent in proportion as there is an entire absence of any toleration in the existing order. The long-foretold fall of Austria may and probably will occur; in any case, triumphant nationalism will achieve the end for which it has so long striven. Domination will cease; racial equality will be established.

Upon Austria's ally the effect of the war will be hardly less profound. The German Empire has also been organised upon a basis of coercion rather than upon a basis of free assent; political power has rested rather with the Prussian military caste than with the German people. It would, indeed, be idle to pretend that the war does not, in a sense, command popular support; the days, if ever there were such days, when men could be

driven like dumb oxen to the slaughter have passed away. When communications were deficient, when there was no press, when foreign intelligence was scanty, delayed and dubious, it was difficult to organise public opinion. The influence of government was enhanced by the ignorance of subjects, and a line of policy might be long followed before opposition to it could become effective.

But at the present day, news is rapidly transmitted, ideas are rapidly disseminated, nor need any man long remain unacquainted with the sentiments of his fellows. As a result, it is almost impossible to adopt and to pursue any policy for an appreciable period unless that policy commands at least the passive assent of a majority in the nation. Least of all can an unpopular war be prosecuted. War affects every section of the community, its consequences are brought home to every individual with graphic force, and the misery inseparable from violent strife will only be endured if it is believed that the ultimate good outweighs the present evil. Had the German people been actively hostile to the present war, either that war would not have occurred or its duration would have been brief indeed.

Yet, though the war has received popular support in Germany, though there has been no definite refusal to perform military service, it has secured support in a very different sense from the sense in which it has gained support in the allied states. For the German Empire it is no "people's war," as was the historic conflict with Napoleon, as were those struggles against Austria and France by means of which national unity was attained. The war is supported, and even applauded, by the many, but it has won support and applause only because both its causes and its character have been unappreciated, because the incubus of militarism has benumbed the mentality of the German people. The race has been deceived; its freedom of thought has been crushed and stifled by the dominant Prussian minority, until it has learned to believe that its salvation, its very life, depends upon implicit obedience to the commands of the general staff.

It is, indeed, very necessary to draw a clear distinction between the dominant military caste and the true German people, between the devotees of efficiency and the intellectual heirs of Luther and Goethe. It is not without significance that those philosophers who have won the favour

of Prussian officialdom are not Germans. They are renegade Slavs; they have preserved those barbarous characteristics which they are so ready to praise in themselves, so ready to reprobate in others. It is the influence of a militarist caste, availing itself of the political myth of Alsace-Lorraine, which has led the German people to acquiesce in, and even actively to support, that policy which has produced the present war. The people are deceived though not corrupted; they are deceived by the militarists, though not corrupted to preference for the militarist *régime*. The war is the war of Prussian ascendancy. It is being fought that the south may still submit to be bullied and coerced. It is a defensive war in that it is an attempt to check the growth of political liberty, an attempt to find some new Reichsland, for the sake of defending and retaining which the existing order may be still endured by those whose deepest convictions impel them to oppose it.

And as the war is the war of Prussian militarism, not the war of the German people, so it is the last war which that militarism will ever wage. To any civilised people, the rule of soldiers is intolerable save upon the ground of extreme necessity. The fiction that such a necessity existed in the

German Empire was created by Bismarck; it has been maintained by the mere fact that Alsace and Lorraine were annexed. But in recent years the fiction has been weakened. The concession of self-government to the Reichsland was an admission that the people of that district could at least be trusted to refrain from actual rebellion, and hence suggested that the necessity for the militarist *régime* had passed away, that the Prussian allegation that such a *régime* was essential for the preservation of the conquests made from France was no longer justified.

Too late, the dominant party realised the educational effect of their momentary weakness; too late, they realised that they had informed Germany that their ascendancy was no longer necessary for national self-preservation. But there was one method by which they might repair their error, and that method they at once adopted. Resolved at all costs to preserve their ascendancy, they embarked upon a war of aggression, availing themselves of the prevalent spirit of obedience in Germany. The disruption of the European concert seemed to afford an opportunity; they believed or hoped that the spirit of other nations was as selfish and unscrupulous as that which filled their own hearts. Prussia forced

war upon Germany, not in obedience to the real desire of the German people, but in order that the deception of that people might be continued, that a second Alsace might be found for the defence of which Prussian military despotism might still be accepted.

The attempt to bolster up a tottering despotism has been made; the attempt will fail. Blunder has followed blunder, miscalculation has followed miscalculation, crime has followed crime. Prussia has ensured her defeat not by any neglect of military precautions but by disregard of those moral factors without the support of which all military precautions are vain. Physical force may accomplish much; it can never overcome those who possess the strength derived from moral conviction. As the military caste is already discredited in the world at large by the mistakes and crimes which it has committed, so it will be discredited in Germany by the defeat which it will sustain. The German people will be undeceived.

Success may be an effective justification of any system; apparent success has seemed to justify even the Prussian system. To all popular demands the dominant class has answered, " The Fatherland in danger! " a cry as idle and as

insincere as was the cry " The Church in danger! " on the lips of a Bolingbroke. But now the Fatherland is indeed in danger. It has been brought into peril by that very militarism, by that very worship of efficiency, which was professedly designed to preserve it from all harm. Here there is a lesson to be learned, here there is a lesson which will be learned. Adversity will fall upon the German people, and from adversity they will be taught that they have been deceived, that they have followed all too readily the falsest of guides, that in their empire the blind have been veritably leaders of the blind. That inborn love of freedom, which destroyed the legions of Varus and which cast off the yoke of an alien church, which hurled Napoleon back across the Rhine and which won national life from the living death of the Germanic Confederation, will once more assert itself.

The Hohenzollerns were offered a glorious destiny; they were called upon to lead a free and united people. They made the great refusal. Retribution has waited long; retribution will now fall upon them. Prussian domination, and all that it implies, will be swept away. True representative government will be established upon the ruins of a military despotism; responsible

ministers will take the place of imperial nominees. The German people will be delivered from the soul-destroying tyranny of false fear, fear of France, fear of Russia, fear of England; they will be delivered from that terror which has been so diligently instilled into their minds by a ruling class trembling for its own ascendancy. Delivered, they will be enabled to pursue their high destiny, enabled to devote themselves to that work for humanity for which they are so well, so truly, fitted. The spirit of Germany will triumph over that of Prussia, the teaching of native philosophers will replace that of pseudo-Slavs, the religion of Luther will prevail over the materialism of the apostles of blood and iron. When the allied armies enter the Prussian capital, they will not appear as the heralds of an era of oppression; they will announce to the German people the dawn of liberty.

VII

MILITARISM

Those who are optimistic enough to hope that out of evil good may come, that the calamities which the world is now enduring will at the last result in benefit for mankind, have one great source of dread. Before the end is reached, there must be some further development of the military machine. Even England has proceeded to the construction of a vast army; over her, the least militarist of all the great powers, there is passing a wave of martial enthusiasm unparalleled in her history. That the nation should so rise to resist German aggression is wholly admirable, but it will be little profit to the world if the destruction of Prussian militarism results only in the substitution for it of the militarism of the Triple Entente. The war can only add to the reputation of armies, and in this lies cause enough for concern as to the future.

History emphasises the justice of such concern. Former wars have not resulted in any abandon-

ment of military preparations, in the development of sincere devotion to the ways of peace. Successful soldiers have availed themselves of their popularity with the many and of reputation gained on the field of battle, to attempt the direction of internal affairs. They have occupied positions which should have been held by statesmen and have introduced into the cabinet the ideas and maxims of the camp. Wellington aspired to be a minister because he had won Waterloo; for no other reason was he tolerated as the holder of high political office. The supremacy of militarism in the German Empire was established at Königgrätz and Sedan; mere civilians were forced to bow before a victorious soldiery.

Victory, and enthusiasm for those by whom the victory has been gained, has often perverted the popular mind. The resultant triumph of militarism has been enhanced and confirmed by a curious delusion which seems often to overcome nations on emergence from any war whether successful or unsuccessful. It is perhaps only natural that the professional soldiers and sailors should believe war to be the normal, peace an abnormal, condition; the wish is father to the thought. But it is almost a commonplace of

history that at the end of any war its renewal is persistently feared. The most complete triumphs do not serve to reassure men's minds. When the Armada had been dispersed, England remained constantly in dread of a renewal of the attempt; the "phantom Armada" caused more trepidation than did the reality. After Sedan, Germany was genuinely afraid of a French attack upon her; her whole policy was directed to guard against this fancied danger, and she even betrayed her ally, Austria, to Russia in an access of such fear.

There is no doubt that when the present conflict is ended, war-scares will be for a time frequent, and those who keep their heads and discredit the stories of a renewed German attack, will be reminded of the suddenness with which the present storm broke, will be regarded as unable to read the signs of the times. It is, therefore, not without reason that many expect a multiplication of the very evils from which the world has suffered for the last forty years. A further increase of armaments may well seem to be the prospect when peace has been restored. It may well be feared that even those states which have hitherto avoided conscription will be forced to adopt it, that the doctrine of the "nation in

arms " will in the near future attain a far greater ascendancy.

Such would indeed be the outcome of the war if Germany were victorious. All fears would be justified a thousandfold. That victory would be the victory of the militarist theory. It would not be the victory of the German people, but of Prussian militarism, of the most reactionary and soulless caste that the world has ever seen. It would mean the triumph of those to whom nothing is sacred, by whom nothing is spared; of those who respect neither the dignity of age nor the innocence of childhood, neither the sanctity of motherhood nor the purity of maidenhood; of those whose excuse for all crimes is the plea that necessity knows no law, who answer the cries of humanity with the brutal retort that war is war, whose creed is the worship of force. To such a triumph the world could never submit. Though the armies of the allies were annihilated, though Paris and London shared the fate of Louvain, though every ship in the allied navies were sunk, still resistance would continue, until mankind had turned defeat to victory. For the very salvation of the race, all nations would be driven to meet the militarists with their own weapons, to train every man, to leave nothing

undone which might fit them for the war of liberation.

But Germany will not gain even a passing triumph. Victory will rest with the allies, and to the eternal good of the human race, the allies are cast in that softer mould which so arouses the contempt of the apostles of blood and iron. Victory will fall to those who have valued honour more than material profit, who admit that the weak have a right to live in freedom, who have dared do reverence to a "moth-eaten scrap of paper." And herein lies hope that the war will secure the destruction of that militarism by which it was produced.

For the allies are the champions of international morality; they deny that might is right, they preach equality. If they used their victory to establish their own arbitrary rule, if they relied upon force, they would be untrue to themselves; they would propagate that very principle against which they have taken up arms. There is reason enough for believing that the allies will not be untrue to their principles; there is, perhaps, the better reason since they would hardly be able to be untrue even if the ruling classes in each state so desired. They would be forbidden by their own people, who have learned the lessons to be drawn from the present state of Europe.

Europe is to-day an armed camp. Nations have multiplied their preparations for war, forming armies so vast that the imagination can scarcely realise their numbers. Veritable walls of steel have been erected along the frontiers of the great powers; all the appliances of modern science, all the ingenuity of the human mind, have been bent to the perfecting of engines of destruction. Men have seemed to live mainly in order that they may learn to take life more effectively; few have been allowed to escape the obligation of learning at least the rudiments of the art of killing. "The nation in arms" has become the watchword of statesmen; it has become a realised ideal in most continental countries. Whatever may be the destined employment of an individual, some portion of his life at least has been spent in the profession of arms. By such means, the powers have provided themselves with a multitude of trained men, highly efficient, though not professional, soldiers.

The cause of this condition of affairs is clear. It has been accepted as an axiom of politics that all nations are hostile to one another, that they wait only for an occasion to strike some deadly blow at a rival. If a state finds a chance, even a remote chance, of inflicting some decisive

defeat upon a neighbour, it will be restrained neither by the sacredness of treaties nor by the curb of international law, neither by thoughts of a common civilisation nor by considerations of economic interest. It therefore behoves every state to guard against a sudden attack. All its resources and energy must be devoted to the task of preparing for the inevitable moment; it can have no hope of peace unless it can compel respect and fear. The fiction that jealousy and hatred must always subsist between nations has been generally accepted, and has produced the acceptance also of the maxim, *Si vis pacem, para bellum.* Not only must the state be prepared, every man in the state must be prepared. Armies must be numerous, and in the very interest of industry, that the work of production may not be hopelessly impeded, conscription follows as a matter of course. In place of a professional army, which would withdraw the best part of the nation's manhood from economic employment, all must receive a degree of training sufficient to fit them to serve their country in the field. Only thus can peace be secured; the normal development of a nation may be checked, but without such safeguards it would be entirely impossible that there should be any development at all.

These theories, however, are based upon fallacies which have already been partially exploded. Nations have prepared for war with a completeness and a vigour unparalleled in history. If by so preparing peace could be secured, a veritable millennium would have dawned. But instead, the world is plunged in war, all the more disastrous because the preparations for it have been so adequate. Thus the fallacy is exposed; that false opinion, zealously propagated by militarists, who loving war have not had the courage of their affection, and have been driven to hypocrisy, has been for ever dissipated. Nothing is more certain than that peace will not be preserved by an increase of armaments. Rather such an increase makes for war. Those who have been burdened for years with the cost of paying for military preparations, those who have been forced to interrupt their ordinary lives to undergo military training, tend almost to desire war; at least, its occurrence would serve to show that money and time had not been expended in vain. The worst calamity is hardly so terrible as constant anticipation of calamity; nations, constantly alarmed by rumours of war, constantly preparing against some half-unrealised evil, become inclined to

find the actual outbreak of hostilities a relief. The peoples of the continent offered no opposition to the policy of their rulers; everywhere the war has met with support from the masses, even though the character and extent of that support have varied greatly in different countries.

In fact, the militarists have accomplished that which was their true intention. Peace was on their lips; war was in their hearts. Their desire was not to prevent conflict but to ensure victory. This much again has been made clear by the present war, the true character of the Prussian military caste has been revealed. The slightest pressure from Berlin would have induced the court of Vienna to soften its note to Serbia; the Dual Monarchy has long been little more than an appanage of the German Empire. Signs of a sincere desire for peace on the part of the German government would have strengthened the hands of England and France, Russia would have been persuaded to abandon her mobilisation, and a conference of ambassadors would have replaced the clash of armies.

But the Prussian militarists, fearing for their continued ascendancy, believed that they had found a suitable opportunity for securing it; the day for which they had prepared seemed to

have dawned. The murder of Francis Ferdinand afforded a plausible excuse for vigorous action. England was supposed to be controlled by a peace-at-any-price ministry, to be threatened by civil war in Ireland, by mutiny in India, and by troubles in Egypt. France was held to be unready; her troops to be worse equipped than on the eve of Sedan. To crush France and to humiliate Russia seemed to be no difficult task; the fiction of Slav barbarism and Teutonic culture would serve to rally the German people round their masters. Victory would check the dangerous agitation in favour of political liberty; the yoke of Prussian militarism would be riveted still more firmly upon the neck of a long-suffering race. In all, there was no desire for peace; the militarists were ready for war, they entered upon war because thereby their own interest would be served. They did not prepare for war, because they desired peace; they spoke of peace, because they desired war.

A further fallacy has also been exposed by the war. The intervention of England on behalf of Belgium, coupled with her refusal to conclude a possibly advantageous bargain with Germany, has thrown a new light upon the character of international relations. It has become clear

that there is at least one nation which is not wholly absorbed in the pursuit of self-interest, and since it is improbable that England possesses a monopoly of political virtue, hope arises that other nations will also obey the dictates of honour. Nor is it a sufficient answer that the interest of England demanded that she should defend Belgium, that the possession of Antwerp by Germany would threaten her. Germany was certainly eager to avoid immediate conflict with England. If England had been so inclined, she could have secured that the Belgians permitted Germany to advance through their eastern provinces and the territorial integrity of the country would have been secured. But such conduct would have involved both a breach of faith and a repudiation of treaties; England was not prepared to sanction a violation of obligations. And the belief that the cynical view of international morality is unfounded on fact is strengthened by the professions of the allies. They have declared themselves to be the champions of the weak and the exponents of the principle of equality. There is in fact an altruism in their action which disposes of the theory that all nations are necessarily immoral. They may act from higher motives than self-interest; friendship

becomes a possibility, treaties may be of some avail, nations are not in a relationship where there is no law save force.

The foundations of the militarist theory are thus shaken if not destroyed; the prevalent system is not justified either on the ground that by it peace may be preserved or on the ground that necessity compels its maintenance. And it has not even served to produce a perfect war-machine. The conscript armies are indubitably efficient; they are ready to endure much, they possess the virtues of discipline and obedience. But in the very nature of things they are imperfect. Composed of men whose ordinary avocations are peaceful, they lack that enthusiasm which is born of pursuit of a chosen employment; they enter upon war from necessity, real or supposed, not from choice. They will fight steadily; discipline up to a certain point replaces enthusiasm. But they are prone to surrender easily, they have often to be driven into battle, they are ready to desert. All these facts are recognised even by the advocates of conscription; the very formation of an officers' corps as a class apart is the outcome of the need for professional leaders, whose sole interest is military. No one has denied that a voluntary army is more efficient and effective

than one based upon compulsion; only need of numbers greater than could be secured by enlistment and the fear that too great a professional army would hamper all production have caused the adoption of coercive methods. It has been believed that by weight of numbers alone can victory be secured. But the present war has already to a certain extent discredited the conscripts. The small, but voluntary, English army proved itself superior man for man to the conscripts; its successful retirement from Mons suggested that numbers are not so important a factor in war as has been imagined; belief in their absolute power has been shaken. Circumstances combine to destroy the existing militarist system; the arguments upon which it has been based have been shown to be at least faulty.

And this fact, taken in conjunction with the political and moral results of the war, will strike the death-blow at militarism. The recognition of nationalism and the abandonment of a coercive *régime* will remove one of the most potent causes of conflict; armies will be less necessary since they will not be required for the maintenance of internal peace. The maintaining of that peace has been often one great cause of the existence of a standing army. If it had not been necessary

to guard against a possible rising in India, England would have been able to dispense with a large part of her military establishment; the recognition of racial equality in India and the grant of self-government will remove this cause. And on the continent also the need for armies will be reduced. By military power alone Russia has preserved her possession of Poland and Finland, Germany has held down Poles and Danes, Austria has checked the tendency to disruption in her dominions. The recognition of the rights of nationalities will remove the need for such coercion and hence for the means of coercion.

It may be admitted that the ruling classes may not readily assent to the discarding of the existing military system. Conscript armies serve their purpose; habits of submission are inculcated and the political sense of the people is deadened. The officers' corps in most European states has been carefully recruited from a particular class, and that class has also directed the policy of the state in reality, even though, as in Germany, the actual ministers have been selected from a different section of society. Their domination has been the more readily accepted because a military life has served to check mental development. Soldiers are notoriously slow of comprehension in politics;

many have entered political life after a successful career in the camp, few have attained even moderate success. Habituated to command, they forget the arts of persuasion; they become either impatient or incapable of argument. The men have less political sense than their officers. Used to obey, they forget that men are free; accustomed to salute, they forget that men are equal. They are ready to admit that a particular class has some inherent right to rule; they are the natural supporters of aristocratic and monarchical government. They are easily induced to accept the ideas and to obey the orders of a ruling class, and it is probable enough that the close of the present war will see some attempt on the part of those ruling classes to preserve their power by deceiving the people into believing that conscription, or at least universal military service, is essential to national salvation. In England, indeed, there have been already signs that such an attempt will be made; it has been tentatively suggested that the existence of a large army would have prevented the outbreak of war. The corollary to this argument is easy to foresee; it will be asserted that to prevent a new war a large standing army must be created or maintained; the fallacy *Si vis pacem, para bellum*

will be the watchword of the ruling class in its last struggle to prevent the triumph of democracy.

But the fallacy of that maxim has already become apparent, the deception of the many has become more difficult, and with the many lies the decision whether militarism shall live or die. The war will compel the extension of popular government even to those lands where it has been least known. Monarchy has ever been a factor making for war; the dominion of a ruling class has ever been hostile to long continued peace. A time of war makes control more necessary and hence engenders a spirit of submission, unless indeed it produces revolt; a ruling class has thus generally profited from war. And that class has been the more ready to disturb peace since upon it the miseries of war fall most lightly. The poor suffer, the rich enjoy the benefit. The evils of scarcity of food or employment press most upon those who have no reserve of capital, upon artisans and upon the professional classes. They may embarrass but they do not seriously injure the wealthy; great landowners often suffer not at all, great manufacturers often profit. A ruling class will rarely be enthusiastic for peace.

But the misery of this war will be brought home to the many. They may rule if they will,

and that they will resolve to rule, to take away the possibility of another war, is certain enough. It is, indeed, inconceivable that the people in any state will any longer consent to be burdened by the weight of armaments, that they will be willing to renew again that exhausting race of ship-building and regiment raising which has marked the last generation. And mere resolve to prevent the continued growth of armaments, organised resolve by the masses in each country, would be enough to secure the defeat of militarism.

But the final destruction of militarism will come from the changed nature of mankind. Even while racial jealousy has been bitter and intolerance rife, militarism has never been popular. At times, perhaps, the glamour of a successful war has beguiled the many and blinded them to the misery; France was so beguiled in the age of Louis XIV. and in the age of Napoleon. But the glamour has soon faded. Napoleon, genius though he was, national hero as he became, found that his popularity was waning before Leipsic; he was driven to inaugurate the Hundred Days by the *Acte Additionel*, a concession to that liberty which he had before been able to destroy as a result of his triumphs on the battlefields of Europe. England's one experience of a military

despotism, under Cromwell, delayed the creation of a real standing army for a century or more; even to-day, the Army Act is an annual measure, and no principle is more emphatically asserted than that to maintain a standing army without consent of parliament is illegal.

Dislike of militarism, hatred of war, will be increased by the present conflict. Every war of modern times has made less appeal to the imagination; there has been less to excite the enthusiasm of the many. A khaki-clad army, with uniforms dust-stained and torn, compares unfavourably from the spectacular point of view with the brilliant soldiery of a bygone age. Weeks of drawn-out fighting, the result of which is long in doubt, have nothing of that dramatic character which marked the battles in which and during a single day the fate of empires might be decided. War has been shorn of much or all of its former glamour; its misery remains and has been intensified. Hence active popular assent to war, never easy to secure and now infinitely more essential, will be harder than ever to obtain. The change of human nature will render it impossible to obtain at all; the deepening of human sympathy and the growth of toleration will serve to persuade mankind that war is an unnecessary evil. The armed camp

will pass away; militarism will cease, and though armies may continue to exist, the maintenance of vast forces will become an impossibility. Even the desire of a ruling class to rule will eventually be extinguished, and by degrees the world will learn that there is a more excellent way, that by mutual toleration and concession all just desires can be satisfied. This war will kill militarism, and will thereby also end war.

VIII

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

THE evils of war can hardly be exaggerated, but those which result from economic strife are almost more appalling. A great war serves at least to supply the necessities of life to numbers of soldiers. The death by which they are constantly threatened ever bears with it the compensation of glory. Certain industries flourish as vigorously or more vigorously in time of war than in time of peace; regular employment is assured those who prepare the requisites for armies in the field. And since war can only be the outcome of action by a government, all the authority and power of the state are directed to minimise as far as possible the resultant distress.

On the other hand, a strike causes widespread suffering, while the palliating circumstances do not exist. The brunt of the day is borne rather by women and children than by men; the agony has often to be endured in silence and in solitude. Death comes hardly less certainly, though it

comes far more slowly and far less gloriously. No monuments are raised to those who have fallen in the cause of industrial liberty; by a large section of their fellows they are hailed rather as villains than as heroes. The state recognises no explicit obligation to cope with misery resulting from action for which it confesses no responsibility. And if ever there were a general strike, the evils which would follow would be far more extensive than those which follow upon a general war. Production of all kinds would cease. The destruction of capital would be so vast that the economic energy even of the richest state would be crippled for years to come, and the more so since those trade booms which generally occur at the conclusion of a war do not occur at the conclusion of some great industrial conflict.

At the present day, strife is the rule rather than the exception in the economic world. Employers and employees regard one another with as much jealousy and distrust as do nations; the prevailing industrial condition is one of open or concealed war. So permanent and inevitable has the conflict between capital and labour appeared to be, that men have despaired of finding means for ending it even in a complete upheaval of society. Suggested solutions have either proved to be

unworkable owing to the imperfections of human nature, or have opened up vistas of evils far greater than those which they have been intended to remove.

Such proposed remedies as co-operation and profit-sharing have been wrecked upon the rock of mutual distrust; the former has suffered from lack of competent management, the latter from doubt as to the sincerity of the employers. The measure of success which has attended either scheme in a few isolated instances has served to emphasise their general inapplicability. Nor does either socialism or syndicalism appear to point the way out of the existing difficulty. The former would concentrate all economic power in the hands of the state. But the state can act only through human agency; extensive or absolute authority would have to be entrusted to a body of men, and for their honesty and sincerity there could be no possible guarantee. It is only too probable that a tyrannous officialdom would be produced, beside which even the Prussian system would appear liberal and free. Revolt would be certain; conflict would be speedily renewed.

The syndicalists aim rather at the destruction of the employer class than at the establishment

of harmony and peace. Every branch of industry would be independently organised under the direction of the workers in that industry; a condition of affairs not dissimilar from that which prevailed in the days of the craft gilds would be produced, and it is probable that identical results would follow. Each organised trade would tend to become more and more exclusive; the practical abandonment of the conception of the solidarity of labour would intensify the already existing hostility between workers whose interests naturally clash. Strife would not cease; it would rather become the very basis of economic life, and men would in all probability revert in disgust to the unhappy conditions of the past.

Yet, though in all these proposals there is little ground for hope, it cannot be that there is in very truth no solution. It would be almost a small matter that war should cease, if economic strife is to continue. The world can never become happy, mankind can never attain to true peace, unless the secular conflict between capital and labour ends. It is unreasonable to suppose that the human race is never destined to make progress, that it is doomed to proceed for ever from one misfortune to another. There must be some solution for the economic difficulty, no less than

for those political difficulties which have in the past distracted the world.

There is such a solution, and its character is revealed by consideration of the false remedies which have been suggested. In all proposals that have been made there is one vitiating factor, the assumption that there is a necessary hostility between employer and employee, between capital and labour. It is obvious that such hostility is not the outcome of the operation of any economic law. Labour and capital are both essential for production; for production on any large scale, where many men are working together, some direction, some management, is also essential in order to prevent hopeless waste of time and material, of energy mental and physical, and the employer class was called into existence in obedience to the demands of the situation. The assumption that the existence of such a class must necessarily be prejudicial to the interests of the labourers is unjustified.

It may be admitted that the aim of the employer is to increase his profits, of the employee to increase his wages; that wages of labour is an element in cost of production, and that, at first sight, any increase in wages must result in a decrease of profits. But not only is it true that

profits depend rather upon the cost of selling than upon the cost of producing, but it is also a well-established fact, and no mere economic theory, that high wages more often than not mean cheap labour. Men work with greater energy and sincerity when their reward is adequate; they have a powerful motive for desiring the continuance of their employment. The consequent increase in production, the saving of material effected, serve to recoup the employer for his increased wages bill; his profits are actually enhanced. The history of the slave states illustrates the fact that high wages often make high profits. Those masters who in effect paid wages by displaying kindness and consideration, who thereby practically introduced a new factor into cost of production, made higher profits than did those who endeavoured to eliminate that factor by withholding such gifts.

Nor need the labourer regard the larger profits of the employer as inflicting so much loss or injustice upon himself. There must be some inducement to secure the expenditure of capital and skill in the work of production. If profits were reduced to a minimum, production would also be lessened; the load of responsibility which rests upon any large employer of labour would

be too great in proportion to the reward received. Men of marked capacity would turn their energy into other channels; the standard of management would decline. Production would thus become less economically wise; loss of capital owing to error would be more frequent. All those disasters which have wrecked co-operative schemes would occur; the labourer would share in the resultant economic distress, and his chance of employment would be reduced.

But though few will be found who would deny the truth of these assertions, yet it cannot be expected that in the present state of society their truth will avail to end industrial strife. Men are moved by passion and prejudice; arguments drawn from an abstract and scientific consideration of economic conditions are wasted when human feelings are deeply stirred. It is idle to insist with a man, convinced that he is being ground beneath the heel of an unjust employer, upon the interdependence of capital and labour. It is idle to suggest to an employer, who has lost a favourable contract owing to the occurrence of a strike for higher wages, that high wages make high profits. In their cooler moments, employee and employer alike may be prepared to admit the force of such arguments.

They will admit nothing of the kind when their blood has been heated to boiling point by some real or imagined wrong. While human nature remains as it is, not all the professors of political economy in the world can convince men that the interests of each party in the industrial conflict are identical. Strife will continue, to the detriment of both employer and employee.

There is, in short, no hope of solution save in the development of a spirit of toleration. Employer and employee must be ready to regard all questions from the other's point of view; there must be real sympathy between the two parties. At present, though there are numbers of good employers and numbers of honest employees, such sympathy does not exist. It is an unfortunate fact that even those who care for their workpeople, who provide them with recreation grounds and model dwellings, who contribute no small portion of their profits to the bettering of the condition of their employees, do all this from a position of fancied superiority. They feel that they are doing more than they need; they glow with a sense of conscious virtue. They demand a tribute of gratitude from their men; they not infrequently attempt to acquire a reputation for

philanthropy that so they may advance their political or social interests.

Nor are the employees less blameworthy. Those who do their work honestly are as yet the exceptions. They assume credit for doing that which it is their duty to do; they expect far more recognition than is compelled under the terms of the contract into which they have entered. They interpret the golden rule to mean that they will so behave towards others as to force those others to do that which they wish them to do.

In fact, the present assumption upon which economic society is based is that all employees will shirk and malinger, if possible, that all employers will grind the faces of the poor, so far as they can do so without risking a conflict with some inconvenient trade union. And this assumption is nothing more than the assumption that the two classes are natural enemies; it is based upon the fact that there is a complete lack of sympathy between the two classes. They are men, and they are subject to the infirmities of human nature; they are filled with that intolerance which is the common characteristic of mankind. Were they tolerant, were they ready to regard the other's point of view, they would realise that it is no less to the interest of the employee to be honest in

his labour than of the employer to care for the welfare of his employees. Self-interest would serve to move them to the exercise of due consideration for each other, since the employee and the employer alike benefit from increased production, from the absence of industrial strife and from the contentment produced by the reception of adequate wages. If these facts were realised, a great step would have been taken towards the solution of the economic difficulty.

But they cannot be realised so long as intolerance is the rule, tolerance the exception, so long as human nature remains what it is. Until that nature has been in some way modified, until industrial relations are based upon love rather than upon hate, upon mutual confidence rather than upon mutual jealousy, economic strife will continue. And there appears, at first sight, little prospect of so beneficial a change in the conditions of the world. Recent years have been characterised by frequent and violent industrial disputes. Strike has followed strike; all attempts at compromise and agreement have seemed to be futile, and on the very eve of the present war the economic condition of the country was one of already profound disturbance with the prospect of even greater disturbance in the near future.

At no time has there appeared to be less sympathy between the two classes; at no time have hatred and jealousy seemed to be so intense.

Even, however, in the very disturbances which have occurred, there has been ground for hope, ground for believing that a change is coming over the industrial world, that out of the very exaggeration of conflict harmony might come. Time after time, trade union leaders have urged their men to avoid conflict, have counselled moderation. It is no easy matter for a labour leader to tell dissatisfied workers that their attitude is unreasonable, that their demands are unjust. Suspicion tends almost inevitably to fall upon him in such a case; he will be readily accused of treason to the common cause. Those leaders who have gone against their men have possessed no ordinary courage and sincerity, have been inspired by no ordinary devotion to duty. They have abandoned the easy road to popularity, the path of vigorous denunciation of the employing class, of eager support of the employees, right or wrong; they have chosen the difficult road of sincerity and truth. That trade union leadership should have come into the hands of such men augurs well for the future. Their influence, directed to make the voice of

reason heard above the storms of passion, can only make for a greater willingness on the part of the employees to understand their employers. And the influence of these leaders will eventually prevail; though individuals will perhaps suffer, the cause which they have championed will triumph, for in cooler moments their counsels will be remembered, and experience of distress suffered from disregard of those counsels will point their wisdom.

Even the very violence of labour agitation, which leads to disregard of the advice of the leaders, tends ultimately to make for peace. The survival of feudal ideas has been responsible in no small measure for the faults of employers. There has been a conviction that the masses were created and exist that the few may thereby benefit; the demands of the labourers have been treated almost as an attempt to change a divinely instituted order. Ready concession by an employer to those demands was almost held to declass him, sympathy with them to be treason to a supposed aristocracy. It was held to be essential that every effort should be made to propagate and to maintain that perversion of the Church Catechism which urges men to do their duty contentedly in that state of life in which it

has pleased God to place them, to refrain, that is, from any effort to raise themselves from that position in which they have the misfortune to be born. For many years, the survival of feudal ideas, and the consequent lack of organisation of labour, led even those who suffered to accept the creed which was preached to them. Sweating was easy, for those who were sweated inclined to believe that it was their Christian duty to be patient under oppression. The masses half believed that God had conferred upon a particular class a prescriptive right to the good things of this world, that it was part of the immutable purpose of Heaven that the majority of mankind should pass through life touching their caps and curtseying to the minority.

But year after year this feudal spirit has declined in strength. Belief in the divine right of those who have to exploit those who have not has almost disappeared; even the stolid agricultural labourers of southern England have begun to doubt the inspiration of their former teachers. The indignity of subservience has been increasingly appreciated; patronage has been more and more resented. The theory of the divine character of kingship died with Queen Anne; the theory of the divine origin of aristo-

cratic privilege, rendered ludicrous by the character of the alleged English aristocracy of to-day, is now well-nigh dead. Neither theory has ever secured the assent of rational men, save in the case of those whose interest impelled them to a convenient self-deception. To-day, its absurdity hardly requires demonstration, unless, indeed, to the Emperor William II. and his associates. The democracy has been enlightened and aroused, and, being roused, has resolved to end for ever the tyranny of those who have so long attempted to monopolise the good things of this world.

But in all this the employing class may well find food for thought. Whether they will or no, they are driven to consider means by which constant strikes may be avoided. Self-interest forces them to examine the case of the employee, to seek for some remedy for such continued unrest. And to this there can be but one result. Neither the employer nor the employee possesses any monopoly of virtue. For every case of heartless exploitation by the one class, there are probably a dozen cases of malingering, laziness and drunkenness in the other. But neither has either class a monopoly of vice. And when one of the two classes strives to appreciate the other's point of view, a better understanding, a deeper

sympathy can only result. Each will perceive that the other has cause for complaint. The labour leaders have already realised that justice is not always on the side of the workers; the masters will soon realise that justice is not always on the side of the employers. Though industrial strife has increased in recent years, the tendency is towards its cessation. It is as the darkness, always greatest when the dawn is at hand. The way to peace may be stormy, the means by which it will be attained violent often and crude, but the path which mankind is following leads assuredly to that haven of rest where the race would be.

Attainment of that haven will be rendered more speedy, less difficult, by all that serves to increase the sympathy of mankind, by all that serves to bring men to a deeper consciousness of their common humanity. And hence the present war will produce economic, no less than political, peace. Common service will bring classes nearer to each other; a great crisis will force them to remember that they are all English, to forget that some employ and others are employed. The battlefields of Europe will be the grave of many men; they will be the grave also of industrial disputes. Common sorrow will complete the

work begun by common service. Sympathy is deepened by experience of distress, mental or physical. Such distress will be the lot of all classes before the present war is ended, and it will be endured to good purpose since thereby the greatest evils which have oppressed the race will be removed.

It would be insane optimism to expect that economic strife will end in a day. Long-seated prejudice does not die easily; deep-rooted convictions persist even when their error has been most amply demonstrated. But eventually that which political economists have so long preached in vain will be believed. A better understanding between employers and employed will be created. The fiction that their relations must necessarily be based upon hostility will go the way of the fiction that upon the same basis all international relations must rest.

Nor will the war affect only the industrial condition of Great Britain. Its economic, no less than its political, effects will be felt in all lands, even in those states which remain neutral. They will be felt in international, no less than in internal, trade. Hitherto, the economic relations of state with state have been determined very largely by the political maxim that all states are

potential enemies of one another. It has been believed that national power can only be maintained at the expense of other nations, that the prosperity of one is the adversity of another. A protective system has been adopted largely in obedience to this theory, as a measure of mere self-defence. The faults of that system have been frequently demonstrated; even the protectionists themselves have declared that in an ideal state of society universal free trade would obtain. The way will now be open for the realisation of this ideal. The danger of war being removed, the path will be clear for the evolution of friendly economic relations. Mankind, its sympathy deepened, its toleration increased, will recognise its solidarity. It will appreciate that the prosperity of one state does not mean the adversity of another. The political argument in favour of protection will be destroyed, and the economic arguments against such a system will have full weight. A *régime* of free trade will be established.

And as this will be in part the result of the removal of danger of war, of the abandonment of the armed camp and of the pursuit of peace by the human race, so the new economic system will itself make for the maintenance of peace. Among

the causes of war, economic rivalry has been one of the most fruitful. Indeed, there has never been a war, from the time of the prehistoric migrations to the present day, which has not had in it an economic element. But that element has been present because the theory of hostility has prevailed. With the destruction of that theory the cause of strife will be removed, and with the removal of the economic cause of war peace will be the better secured. Not only will a new era dawn, its continuance will be assured. The present war will end economic conflict no less certainly than it will end the conflict of armies.

IX

ATHLETICISM

One of the most remarkable features of the last hundred years in England has been the constantly increasing attention which has been devoted to athletics of all kinds. Though it is alleged that Wellington attributed the victory of Waterloo to the beneficent influence of the playing fields of Eton, yet at that date sport, in its modern sense, was almost unknown. Horse-racing, indeed, was general, but even such classic events as the Cesarewitch and Cambridgeshire had still to be founded. In steeplechasing, the Grand National was unknown. It was not until fourteen years after Waterloo that the first university boat race was rowed; another generation elapsed before it became a strictly annual event. The Marylebone Club dates back to Napoleonic times, but the county cricket championship began within living memory, and the Australians had still to pay their first visit when the Franco-German War was fought. Golf championships were unknown little more than fifty years ago;

south of the Tweed, golf courses were almost non-existent. The Rugby Union was founded in the same year as the modern German Empire; the Football Association is only slightly older. A comparison of the amount of space devoted to sport in the ordinary daily press on the eve of the present war with the amount similarly devoted a generation ago will serve to emphasise the development of athleticism in the interval.

That development has sometimes been regarded as proof of national decadence. Abusive epithets have been hurled at those who play cricket and football; it has not been uncommon to point to the superior merit of the German race, which is alleged to devote to the art of war, or to the prosecution of cottage industries, the time that the Englishman expends in the playing of idle games. Yet it is certainly true that devotion to sport does not in itself prove decadence. Those who have spread the fame of England through the world, who have done most to build up the empire, have not been generally hostile to athletics. If the more prominent statesmen have not generally been distinguished for athletic ability, this may possibly be attributed to physical causes. The men of action have been also athletes. At the present moment, the naval

and military forces of Great Britain contain many a man who has already achieved fame at Lord's or Queen's Club, at Inverleith or Phœnix Park. In the casualty lists, the names of men distinguished in some form of athletics have frequently appeared; ability to play cricket, football, golf, does not necessarily incapacitate a man from serving and dying for his country.

None the less the complaint that devotion to sport has been carried to an excess is not wholly unjustified. Any one who has read the columns of certain papers, even of papers possessing a reputation for sobriety, must have wondered at human capacity for the exaggeration of trifles. A foreign victory at Henley or in the Olympic Games has been hailed as a national disaster. It might be supposed that the fate of the empire depended upon the result of a test match, that association football was the serious business of life. The appearance of the crowd at any important match suggests the reflection that men might spend their time better than in watching others play games.

Sport has, indeed, been very largely commercialised to the detriment of its power for good. County cricket has become a business rather than a game; the number of sixpences received at the

turnstiles seems to be often the most vital consideration, the press devotes more attention to the number of spectators present than to the finer points of play. Sport for sport's sake has become rarer. Association football clubs have attained a close resemblance to theatrical companies; their directors are concerned mainly with securing adequate dividends. Men have tended to devote to athletics time and attention which can ill be spared from more serious matters. The spectacular side of games has been exaggerated, and the nation, as a whole, tends rather to watch than to play, to applaud and to bet rather than to take exercise. In all this there is reasonable ground for complaint, for wonder whether the modern devotion to sport does not actually constitute a national danger.

Because it has been regarded as a danger, some have almost welcomed the present war. They have hoped that it will act as a species of moral tonic, that men, brought face to face with a great crisis, will in future view all things in a juster proportion. War news has already filled that space which was previously devoted to sport; football editions have been replaced by war specials; the cry "All the winners" is hardly heard. Men have something more serious and

more enthralling to consider than the result of a race or a cup-tie. For moral and economic reasons the absolute cessation of sport has been avoided, but the present football season, both in point of the number of matches played and of the degree of interest aroused, will bear a very faint resemblance to the seasons of past years.

But though, for the moment, sport is naturally dislocated by the war, it is perhaps doubtful whether the change will be permanent, whether at the restoration of peace things will not resume their normal course. Some, indeed, hope and expect that they will not do so. For years a certain section has advocated universal military service. They have recognised that devotion to athletics serves to prevent the acceptance of their proposals, and though they have generally attacked rather the spectators than the actual players, they have not regarded the latter with any very friendly eye. They have argued that men should learn first to drill and to shoot; afterwards, perhaps, and in their spare time, they might also play games. This party has been filled with a great hope by the present war. Gladdened by the sight of thousands hastening to join the army, they have given rein to their optimism. They have been moved to believe

that the change, now apparent, will be permanent, that the supposed period of decadence is ended, that the nation will no longer trifle with its destiny. They almost expect that military training will remain general, that Saturday afternoons will be spent at rifle ranges or on parade grounds instead of in some sixpenny ring around a football ground. They trust that the heroes of the people will no longer be mere players of games, but exponents of the art of war. Militarism will take the place which sport has so long usurped.

Fortunately for the welfare of mankind, such hopes will be falsified, and the war will have exactly the contrary effect from that which the militarists desire. At the moment the country is passing through a crisis of unparalleled gravity; the people are therefore ready to undergo military training, as they are ready to make any and every sacrifice which their country demands. It is more than probable that conscription could have been introduced without arousing any serious opposition, and the government deserve the gratitude not only of this, but of every other, nation for having refrained from the adoption of so obvious an expedient. But to suppose that the readiness to practise the use of arms will continue when peace has been restored is to

misunderstand both the spirit of the English race and the whole purpose of the present war.

That war is being fought to crush Prussian militarism, by which the peace of Europe has been disturbed and the liberty of mankind endangered. Englishmen have always been anti-militarist; the army has generally been regarded as a possible source of danger, and has been the subject rather of suspicion and dislike than of pride or affection. To this acute political sense the nation owes its freedom and its greatness. A standing army has always been a factor making for despotism; to the lack of such an army the defeat of the Stuarts may be largely attributed. The peaceful conversion of England into a veiled republic would hardly have been possible if the Hanoverians had possessed a strong military force. The organisation of the empire upon the basis of free assent would have been impossible if England had been controlled by a military caste. And it is because they are anti-militarist that Englishmen have enlisted so readily for service in the present war. Prussian militarism will be destroyed; no *régime* of British militarism will be established upon its ruins. Neither conscription, nor any equivalent system of compulsory military training, will be introduced; the

object lesson afforded by the effect of militarism upon Germany will prove more effective than reams of argument. Englishmen will not abandon their football grounds or their golf links for rifle ranges; the violation of Belgian neutrality supplies the best possible answer to those who have advocated the idea of " the nation in arms," and nothing is more certain than that the victory of the allies in a war against militarism will kill militarism for ever.

Sport, however, will not be unaffected; the influence of the present crisis will extend to all sides of life. As men have been moved to think more seriously, so they will in the future be less extravagant. An athletic defeat will no longer be magnified into a national calamity; there will be less attention to championships and to averages or records; there will be less idolisation of prominent athletes. Sport will become less spectacular; less money will be expended on it, if only because there will be less money to be spent when the attendances at matches have declined.

But sport will not suffer a decline. Its character will be modified, and perhaps modified for the better, but there will be rather an increase than a decrease in the number of athletes. That this

must be a result of the war will be clear if the circumstances of the present conflict are considered. Service in the field will develop the physical energy of the race; the military training of those who do not actually enter upon active service will have the same effect. This energy must necessarily find some outlet. Such an outlet would possibly be afforded by compulsory service, but hatred for militarism will be intensified by the war, and having endured all things that a military *régime* might be destroyed, the nation will not be brought to consent to the creation of such a *régime* in England. Hence the exuberant physical energy of the race can find expression only in athletics; the number of players will increase, though that of the spectators will diminish.

The same result will be the indirect outcome of that growth of toleration which will be the principal result of the present war. That spirit is hostile to extravagance of all kinds; it consists very largely in placing all things in their due relationship. The difference between toleration and intolerance is little more than the difference between the consideration of trifles and the consideration of broad issues; the man who is intolerant insists upon the petty peculiarities

and faults of his neighbours, the man who is tolerant regards the fundamental points in their character. But any one who takes broad views is bound to recognise that sport is not a matter of vital importance, that the result of a race or of a game need not seriously disturb the equanimity of mankind. He will realise, indeed, the value of athletics; he will not assign to athletics a place in the scheme of things to which they are not legitimately entitled. The passion for sport will be restrained; attendances will decline and expenditure will decline also. Those who formerly watched will now tend to play. There will be an increase in all branches of sport, but it will be an increase of athleticism. The very result which many have desired will be secured; there will be a certain reversion to the conditions of an earlier period. Sport will regain something of the character which it possessed a generation ago; it will become less commercial and more athletic.

And such a revival of real athleticism will serve to assist the general progress of the race. Acting as a physical safety-valve, it will confirm the defeat of militarism. Being highly democratic in its nature, it will serve to break down the barriers between class and class, since capacity in a particular form of sport will be more regarded

than supposed social standing by those who are playing games together. That modification of human nature which will be the result of the present war will be not a little aided by that change in the character of English sport which it will have originally contributed to produce.

X

FEMINISM

THE present age has been marked by a growth of the desire for equality. The allies took up arms largely in obedience to that desire; they refused to admit the material or moral superiority of the German Empire. Subject races have displayed increasing dissatisfaction with their subordinate position; in every land, the authority of a ruling class has been questioned with more and more insistence, and the masses have inclined to refuse submission even to the leaders whom they have themselves selected. The desire has extended to the relations of the sexes; the feminist movement is nothing more than an attempt to establish equality between men and women. It demands that the right to exercise the franchise should no longer depend in any sense upon sex; that all forms of employment should be thrown open to women; that equality before the law should be actually established.

As might have been expected, these demands

have been resisted. In the past, men have possessed a certain prerogative; they have ruled and women have obeyed, even though feminine arts have often converted an apparent subjection into an absolute superiority. A ruling class rarely abdicates its position without a struggle. The history of England since Waterloo is little more than a record of the efforts of a dominant clique to preserve its dominion. The Prussian military caste has forced the German people into war rather than submit to some partition of its authority. Men have similarly opposed the feminist movement, and with the greater vigour because the advocates of women's rights have been guilty both of folly and of violence. In Scandinavia they have afforded plausible grounds for the charge that they desire not liberty but licence; that they are using the plea of sex-equality to secure freedom to gratify vicious desires. In England, the militant suffragists have alienated moderate opinion by wanton destruction of property; they have made many feel that any concession to them would be a concession to the forces of anarchy and subversive of the very foundations of political society.

And opposition having been aroused and increased, some justification for it has been sought

in nature. It has been argued that equality between the sexes is impossible; that it could be secured only through the medium of a physiological revolution; that until such a revolution occurs, men will remain men and women will remain women, each possessing advantages and suffering disadvantages inherent in their very nature. It is argued that the very difference between the sexes indicates that in the order of nature one is intended to rule; it is suggested that the good of each is to be found not in a revolt against, but in acceptance of, natural laws. Equality in other directions may be attained as a result of the general progress of the human race; sexual equality will never be attained. Women must continue to occupy a position somewhat subordinate, because that position has been assigned to them by nature.

In such arguments and assertions there is an obvious element of justice. Literal and absolute equality is an impossibility; the physical divergence between the sexes cannot be overcome. Certain types of employment must remain closed to men, certain to women. And the mentality of the sexes is also different; power of intuition is essentially a feminine gift, and women do not generally excel at close analysis or argument.

Certain forms of intellectual employment must normally be confined to the male sex, as certain other forms will normally be confined to the feminine sex. Thus the teaching of very young children will perhaps always be better performed by women; the secondary education of boys be better entrusted to men. The first demands sympathy and rapid intuition; the latter may demand sympathy, but it demands also a certain measure of brutality.

When, however, all this has been admitted, the argument is still somewhat unconvincing. It does, indeed, little more than juggle with the term "equality." It does not justify the denial of equality. It would be as reasonable to deny racial equality because all races have their own peculiar merits and demerits; to deny the rights of nationalities because the nationalist principle cannot be everywhere applied. It is almost as though a state were to justify the tyranny of a minority, because men are not born equal in brain-power, in virtue, in physical strength, or in any other material sense. The feminist cause is not really damaged in the least by the frankest possible admission that there is a profound divergence between the sexes, and that such divergence is necessarily permanent.

It rather gains by such an admission, since it indicates a growth of toleration, and to intolerance the conflict of the sexes must be attributed. With the best will in the world, a man often finds it impossible to appreciate a woman's point of view, or a woman to appreciate a man's. In the past, and so far as the feminist movement is concerned, the sexes have displayed, perhaps, little desire to understand one another. But the growing wish for equality indicates also a growth of toleration, for the wish is not confined to those who have hitherto suffered from inequality, but extends also to those who have profited. The feminist demand is in effect a demand for toleration. It suffers, therefore, in reasonableness in so far as its advocates have been guilty of violence and of intolerance either in action or language; admission of the validity of certain objections to the granting of the demand is almost a victory for the feminist cause. Everything which makes for an increase of toleration makes also for the granting of the demand for sex-equality.

The present war, accordingly, will tend to assist the feminist cause, though it will have the effect of modifying the character of the demands made. Already, the gravity of the present crisis

has caused a cessation of militancy. Its resumption would in any case be difficult, since a period of reflection can only impress upon its organisers and supporters the errors of their past conduct. That conduct has resembled the conduct of the Germans in the lands which they have invaded; it has been directed to create a reign of terror in order to secure the granting of demands made. Such a course of action tends to defeat its own object by creating a spirit of undying hatred; at the present moment, it is the more fatal as being opposed in its very essence to the prevalent spirit of toleration, to which alone the feminists can look for success.

That success will be in a large measure attained. The war will produce greater harmony between nations, between political parties and between classes; it will produce also a greater harmony between the sexes. Each will realise more fully its need of the other. Men will have died in thousands in defence of their womenfolk; women will have faced hardships and dishonour worse than death that they might bring comfort to those who have suffered for them. The path will be opened for mutual concessions, for the establishment not indeed of absolute but of practical equality, for the removal of those

abuses of which the existence is generally admitted.

The war will be followed by that grant of the franchise which has long been felt to be inevitable, though it has been delayed by the militant agitation. Reform in the law with the object of placing the two sexes on the same footing will be accomplished. The way will be prepared for the solution of that mass of problems which revolves round the question of female labour, and that solution will be reached not by the dictation of one sex but by the co-operation of both.

But the most important recognition of equality, and that which will have the most far-reaching effects, will be brought about by the changed nature of mankind. In all ages and in all countries, a different standard of morality has existed for men from that which has existed for women. The distinction admits of an obvious and a plausible justification, but it is yet based neither upon pure reason nor upon justice. For its existence women have been largely responsible; it is notorious that no one is so intolerant of the moral failings of her own sex as a good woman, no one so eager to secure the social ostracism of a feminine sinner. To the influence of women, in

fact, is due the pardon of men who are guilty of vice, and the condemnation of women similarly guilty. But both sexes will learn a deeper and truer sympathy as a result of the present war. They will not, indeed, excuse vice, or strive to identify it with virtue; but they will remember that temptation comes not equally to all, and they will learn the blessedness of forgiveness. And herein will be found the remedy for much of that evil which is so legitimately deplored. Many women, who have fallen ever lower and lower, have owed their misfortunes to the intolerance of their mothers and sisters. Dread has driven them to concealment; necessity for concealment has forced them to abandon that chance of recovery which their home might have afforded them. They have drifted into deeper seas of temptation; their penitence, sincere enough, has not availed to save them in face of their inability to undo the past; social ostracism has wedded them to a life of sin. All might have been avoided, if those who had not fallen had been ready to make allowance. Such readiness will now be forthcoming; a woman, guilty of one act of haste or passion, will receive that indulgence which is already extended to men in like case. Those barriers between the

sexes, which nature has established, cannot be removed; the growth of toleration, resulting from the present war, will remove those barriers which have been erected by the perversity and intolerance of mankind.

XI

CULTURE

In all their attempts to alienate neutral opinion from the allies, the German publicists have put forward more especially one particular contention. They have asserted that Germany is the armed apostle of *Kultur;* they have declared that the world is threatened by a wave of Slav barbarism, and that England is a traitor to the common cause of human enlightenment. Germany is fighting the battle of the race; she is defending all that men should hold most sacred. As she has been the foremost champion of civilisation in the past, so now she is ready to expend all her treasure and all her blood, if so she may prevent that return to the dark ages which would follow upon the victory of Russia. All those, therefore, who value the progress of mankind should rally to the support of Germany; a support which she demands as a right, since upon her and upon her ruler has devolved the mantle of Charlemagne.

There is no reason for supposing the German publicists to be insincere in this statement of

their case; there is no reason for supposing that they doubt the supreme merit of their culture and the barbarism of their enemies. They have their adherents beyond the borders of Germany. Even in England there are many who dread the victory of Russia, who view with profound regret the necessity which has ranged Anglo-Saxon and Slav together against the Teutons. In many lands, German pre-eminence in culture is freely admitted. It is believed that, whatever may be the origin of the present war, whatever may be the justice of the allied cause, at least the leadership of civilisation has long rested with the German race.

The services which that race has rendered to mankind cannot be denied. In research of all kinds, the Germans are certainly pre-eminent; their accuracy and diligence are beyond dispute. In music, they have long held almost undisputed sway; they have given to the world many of its most profound philosophers. German education is notoriously efficient. But when all this has been conceded, it must also be conceded that German culture labours under very serious disadvantages. The Germans excel rather at compilation than at the higher arts of selection and criticism; their genius is adaptive and

painstaking rather than creative. With them, inexhaustible patience has been a substitute for inspiration. It almost seems as if the prevailing militarist spirit has extended its baleful influence even over learning; the Germans seem almost to have attempted to organise knowledge as they have organised an army, to drill the sciences as they have drilled their conscripts. Thus they have laboured to degrade history to the mere chronicling of events; accumulating facts, they have been barren of ideas, and though they have produced admirable editions of original authorities and scholarly versions of documents, their criticism, when it has attempted to pass beyond mere discussion of authenticity, has possessed at most a secondary value. Great as have been their services to the cause of human knowledge, the Germans have neither acquired nor will they ever acquire that monopoly of culture to which they lay claim.

For culture is international, not national. Its progress and development can only be rapid when it is favoured by the support of the diverse genius of different races. Each race has its part to play in the extension of civilisation and of knowledge. To whatever branch of learning attention may be turned, it will be found that

other nations have made contributions no less valuable than those made by the Germans. Without regarding the vast achievements of other races in the more or less distant past, it is worth while to remember that radium was discovered by a Frenchwoman, wireless telegraphy by an Italian, the periodic law by a Russian, the telephone by an American, the X-rays by an Englishman. In art and architecture, the Teutonic races are inferior to the Latin; even in music their monopoly is not unchallenged.

It has been said that it requires a German to discover the facts of history, an Englishman to select those which are of importance, and a Frenchman to reveal their meaning. And this remark pointedly illustrates the intellectual interdependence of the different nations. One race produces men with the requisite patience, another the men with the necessary power of distinguishing between essentials and non-essentials, a third the men with imaginative capacity. A Frenchman would tend to produce attractive fables rather than history; an Englishman would tend to produce a carefully arranged and colourless summary, the German a vast compendium of unrelated data. Neither one of the three races would achieve much without the others. But

working together, each produces something of value; their co-operation results in an increase in human knowledge and in the progress of civilisation.

And not only is it true that the Germans have no monopoly of culture; it is also true that in their culture there is a singular defect. The race is characterised by a general lack of a sense of humour, and this lack is greater in the Prussian section of the race than in any other. The comic papers of the German Empire are distinguished rather by vulgarity than by wit; they exaggerate the worst characteristics of French humour, without possessing the redeeming qualities of grace and delicacy of expression. A Frenchman can write so charmingly of a sewer that the reader forgets the unpleasantness of the subject in delight at the beauty of the treatment; a German writes so realistically that the very air is contaminated. But this realism is little more than crudity; the beauty and joy of life are forgotten in insistence upon its horrors and sordidness. Humour is vulgarised, or rather, the humour is to seek. In all their literature there is a certain pomposity, a certain exaggeration of detail, which reduces its merit even when it does not nauseate.

In their everyday life, the Prussians display

this same lack of a sense of humour. No other government could have made itself the laughing-stock of Europe as has that of William II. Prosecutions for *lèse-majesté* have amused the world; ridiculous penalties have been imposed upon those who have dared to smile at the antics of the "War-Lord" or who have declined to take the officer caste seriously. Yet if culture be real, if it possess any true worth, it must enable men to take wide views; it must help them to recognise their own foibles and follies, to appreciate a joke against themselves. This the German people appear to be unable to do; they even lament the capacity in others. Their newspapers have taken English soldiers to task for daring to jest about war; they have rebuked English statesmen for using the phraseology of sport to illustrate the present crisis. It would appear to be a sin to smile at the chosen people of God. Wit must be controlled from Potsdam; laughter should proceed by sections, at the word of command. In the matter of humour, Germany certainly enjoys no undisputed pre-eminence.

Even, however, if the German race did possess that pre-eminence which they claim, that monopoly of *Kultur*, the victory of the allies would not necessarily be a triumph of barbarism. They

have not the power, nor is it their desire, to subjugate the German people. They aim only at the overthrow of a ruling caste, of Prussian militarism. They are fighting against Prussia rather than against Germany, and the south Germans have been drawn into this war only because they have also been deluded by the ruling section. That section has also the least claim to represent German culture. Ethnographically, the Prussians are rather Slav than Teutonic; the southern Germans look to Vienna rather than to Berlin, and tend to deny the claim of their actual rulers to the possession of the German name. Nor have the Prussians taken the lead in the intellectual development of Germany. Music is the form of art which comes nearest to being a monopoly of that race; not a single great musician has been a Prussian. Even in the field of politics, the makers of modern Germany have not been generally Prussians; the most representative portion of the German race is to be found south of the Main. And the destruction of Prussian militarism would prepare the way for the ascendancy of the south, nor would culture suffer greatly by the transference of political power to the hands of those who take a kindlier and happier view of life and of mankind.

The victory of the allies, in fact, will be no defeat of culture. It will rather secure its wider prevalence. In the German Empire, the intellect will be freed from the incubus of militarism, as it has been freed in the past from the cramping influence of a corrupt and intolerant Church and from slavish imitation of French models. The true German people will assert itself; gaiety will return to lands long oppressed by the seriousness of a dominant class, so jealous for its supremacy that it has not dared to permit a smile. It has been remarked that the French Revolution killed laughter; the triumph of the allies will do something to bring laughter back to life.

But not only will Germany itself profit by being freed from hampering restrictions; the whole world of culture will equally benefit. The triumph of toleration is the victory of the highest intellectual qualities. International sympathy will increase at the expense of international jealousy. Mankind will realise its common civilisation more fully; it will appreciate better the divergent merits of different races. Energy which has been expended upon the perfection of engines of destruction will be diverted into more beneficial paths. All nations, united in a common

brotherhood, will be enabled to labour, each in its own sphere, for the general advancement of mankind.

The allies, moreover, are the champions of political liberty. But the greatest enemy of intellectual progress has always been the domination of a ruling class. In the Middle Ages, the Church crushed independent thought that heresy might not arise; the literature of southern France was sacrificed that the Albigensians might not propagate their opinions; the tortures of the Inquisition long awaited those who dared to exercise openly their right of private judgment. Censorship of the press has, in more recent times, been a recognised adjunct of despotism, and even when liberty has been theoretically attained, a ruling class has still laboured to prevent its full development, silencing, as far as possible, the free expression of opinion and checking the growth of education.

So long, indeed, as a ruling class exists in any country, culture in that country will be hampered; all the influence of the rulers will really be directed to this end. Education and learning themselves will be prostituted to the political necessities of the governing class; the fiction that some matters must not be discussed will be zealously

propagated. A servile press will be trained to conceal or to deny notorious vice or ineptitude in a king, to credit royalty with a host of non-existent virtues. All that deserves respect and honour gains by the freest publication of the truth; a ruling class, since it deserves neither respect nor honour, naturally dreads such free publication. But the perpetuation of a lie is inimical to all intellectual development; culture cannot flourish where political or dynastic considerations compel silence even on matters of public import. The imposition of such silence has been specially characteristic of Germany; William II. has endeavoured in this way to conceal his many absurdities. The defeat of Prussia in the present war will free men's tongues in Germany and in all other lands; henceforth, it will be impossible to check the open expression of opinion. For political reasons, states have laboured to fetter the intellect; with the true establishment of political liberty, they will have neither the power nor the desire to do so in the future, and culture will increase with the increase of freedom. The present war will accomplish that which the Reformation and the French Revolution laboured to accomplish; it will complete the emancipation of the human intellect.

XII

RELIGION

THERE is a certain reluctance at the present day to insist upon the religious aspect of political questions; there is a certain readiness to shelve all discussion of such an aspect and to assume that the days when religion was a factor in politics have passed. Yet, at least since the foundation of Christianity, there have been few wars in which there has not been a religious element or which have been barren of effect upon churches. The very triumph of the barbarian invaders of the Roman Empire facilitated the spread of the Christian faith. The victories of England in her many mediæval wars with France prepared the way for that destruction of the temporal supremacy of the Pope which was finally accomplished at the Peace of Westphalia. The Romantic Revival was not the least important of the causes which led to the downfall of Napoleon; the occasion of the Franco-German War enabled the Italian government to reduce

the Pope to the position of "prisoner of the Vatican."

To this general rule, that in all wars there is a religious element, the present conflict offers no exception; to neglect that element would be to ignore one of the most important aspects of the struggle. The German Empire is inspired by a new gospel. Whether from sincere conviction, or from a belief that the end justifies the means, the German people have adopted as their practical creed the ideal "Deutschland über Alles." They have turned from the worship of a beneficent Deity to the cult of efficiency; material strength has become with them a fetish. All actions, whether it be the violation of a treaty or the sacking of a town, the terrorisation of civilians or the destruction of historic monuments, are to be justified on the supreme ground of necessity. The domination of Germany is the end which excuses all means, the ideal which guides all conduct, the practical religion of the German people.

In so far as Christianity is a creed of self-sacrifice and of care for others, this ideal is anti-Christian. Nor is this the less true because it has gained the support of German ecclesiastics, because the policy of the government is approved and applauded by the clergy of the German

Empire. Since the conversion of Constantine the Great, no government, however base and corrupt, however barbarous and tyrannical, has ever lacked clerical support. In the history of England alone, there are numerous instances of the fact that the favour of the Church is not invariably given to the cause of justice or of liberty. John was able to employ clerks to confiscate the goods of their fellows; the Stuarts, labouring to undo the work of previous centuries and to establish a despotism, found ecclesiastics enthusiastic in their favour. The doctrine of passive obedience was invented for the benefit of would-be absolute monarchs, and Charles I. was exalted into a saint by a servile episcopate. The votes of the bishops in the House of Lords have constantly been given against attempts to ameliorate the lot of the poor. Nor has the established Church of England been distinguished for its tolerance, though it may possibly claim with justice to have been less intolerant than almost any other church.

But in actual fact, a very clear distinction must be drawn between Christianity and Christian churches. The former can exist without organisation; it is a belief, a code of moral principles. A church must be organised; its very existence

demands a certain measure of intolerance, and entire absence of coercion would produce anarchy and death. It is, however, impossible for any church to compel obedience without some assistance from the civil power; the greater the degree of the assistance so rendered, the stronger will be at least the public position of the church. Hence it is not surprising that ecclesiastics should have generally welcomed an extension of the powers of government, and more especially of the power of a king. The interests of a despotism or of a ruling class are identical in most instances with those of a dominant church; to both, the repression of freedom of speech is an invaluable asset, and to both, the propagation of the fiction of divine right seems necessarily to lend authority. William II. is the modern exponent of that outworn fallacy; he is the professed and ablest champion of the monarchical cause. It is only natural that the Lutheran Church should rally round a man whose victory would seem to promise to it an ascendancy such as it has never yet enjoyed even in Germany and the north. But it by no means follows that the ideal for which the German Empire stands is a Christian ideal, or that it has any actual connection with Christianity.

The allies contend for a wholly different ideal.

They have adopted as their own the very principles upon which the German publicists have tended to pour such contempt. A solemn undertaking is to them something worthy of regard. Efficiency may be bought too dearly; material advantage purchased at too high a price. Force is not the only valid argument; the survival of the fittest is at best a lamentable commentary upon the imperfection of man and the blindness of nature. The allies champion the weak against the strong, equality against domination, liberty against tyranny. They are the enemies of intolerance; they are the exponents of toleration.

Their victory will, therefore, be in a large measure the victory of Christianity, and it will be this the more because it will not be the victory of any particular church. In the past, and so far as Christianity is to be identified with sympathy for others and with toleration, the triumph of a religious party has been rather detrimental to the cause of religion. Thus after the Great Rebellion England was exposed first to the tyranny of the Puritans and then to that of the restored Church; the triumph of Protestantism in the Revolution was marked by rigorous persecution in Ireland. It is, perhaps, to the advantage of the Christian faith, as opposed to

Christian churches, that the allies represent different creeds. Not only will their co-operation tend to enable them to appreciate the merits of each other's beliefs, but their victory will be that of the broad principles of Christianity rather than of those paltry dogmas by which the broad principles have often been obscured.

The churches, however, will also be affected by the war; the victory of toleration will influence religious organisations no less than political. The Protestant churches will tend to approach more nearly to the original principles of the Reformation; to admit that right of private judgment to which they owe their foundation and which by their conduct they have so persistently denied. The Orthodox Church will incline towards a greater breadth of view. Whereas its influence in the Russian Empire has hitherto been on the side of tyranny, it will now be exerted to further the growth of liberty.

But it is upon the Roman Church that the effect of the war will be most profound. That church has, with some injustice, been not unusually regarded as the champion of intolerance. It would be idle to deny the vices of many of its rulers or the crimes which have been committed in its name; the horrors of the Inquisition are

well known, and the world has seen recent examples of a persecuting spirit in such decrees as that "Ne Temere." It would, however, be a misunderstanding of the Roman Church to assert that such persecution is inseparable from its whole spirit. In its essence, the Roman Church presents that aspect of Christianity which involves the most complete submission to the will of God; it insists upon simple faith, upon humility and upon obedience. In the hands of some of its exponents it goes further than this; it labours to proselytise, and by the very perfection of its organisation it is rendered the more intolerant of any variation from authorised belief. Attention to detail has partially obscured the essential.

The present war offers to the Roman Church an unique opportunity. Its power to coerce will be sensibly reduced by the practical disappearance of Austria-Hungary, the leading Catholic power; its political influence will be minimised; it will be driven to rely upon persuasion rather than upon force. And herein lies the occasion, ready to be seized; an occasion which, if duly used, will enable Benedict XV. to go down to posterity as one of the greatest of the Popes. It is an opportunity to infuse a new spirit of toler-

ance into the Church; to abandon for ever those political ambitions which have in the past proved to be a snare and a delusion; to adapt itself to the new spirit of the age and to prove that in the new era upon which the world is entering there is still room for childlike faith and submission to an Almighty.

The policy which should be adopted to secure this end is easy to describe; reconciliation with the kingdom of Italy, a less severe attitude towards the more liberal minded of the Church's children, the renunciation of those methods of conversion which have excited the alarm and distrust of mankind. It is not too much to expect that the opportunity will be taken. In the past the Roman Church has never failed to profit from the crises in her history. She rather gained than lost at the Reformation by the withdrawal from her communion of races which were unsuited by temperament and the circumstances of their national life for sincere acceptance of her doctrines. When the Church was threatened by man's passion for learning, she was saved by the Society of Jesus, which proved that Catholicism and intellectual activity were not necessarily incompatible. Benedict XIV. was distinguished for his conciliatory attitude; it is almost certain

that the present Pope adopted this predecessor's name with deliberation, and that Benedict XV. will acquire a similar reputation.

Whatever may be the fate of churches, toleration will triumph in the present war. Members of different religious sects will realise that there is work for all to do; they will insist upon their harmony rather than upon their divergence; they will appreciate the fact that all are agreed in wishing to do that which is best for the human race. Differences of opinion will continue; not every man will accept this or that interpretation of the Christian ideal. But differences will be respected and tolerated; the triumph of a particular church will be less regarded than the elevation of mankind.

For the change in human nature, which the war will serve to effect, will involve an increase of sympathy, and the Christian religion will gain where churches may appear to lose. Men will be inspired rather by the ideal of love for their fellow-men than by devotion to dogmas. They will find their guidance rather in the Sermon on the Mount than in the more denunciatory passages of the Pauline epistles; they will think less of damnation and more of salvation, less of themselves and more of others. Toleration will replace

conflict, and war, already rendered practically impossible by the resolution of mankind, will be more than ever prevented by the removal of one prolific source of quarrel, the hostility of divergent creeds. Christianity, considered as the gospel of peace and mutual assistance, will have gained a noteworthy triumph when the armies of the allies have won their final victory.

XIII

SOCIAL REFORM

NOTHING has been more universally recognised than the need for social reform, the existence of many evils urgently demanding remedy. The prevalence of misery and want, of vice and crime, is too patent to admit either of denial or of neglect, and all political parties are agreed that the removal of such stains upon the alleged civilisation of the race is one of the most important duties of government. Yet though there is this agreement as to the necessity for reform, though the action of the state has been seconded by private effort, though a mass of palliative legislation has been attempted, the practical result has been singularly disappointing. It is not easy to prove that England to-day is a much happier country than was England a hundred years ago; there are not wanting some who roundly declare that she is far less happy.

The cause of this failure to effect a complete reform must clearly be sought in the organisation of society. For any scheme of reform to have real success, it must first of all be inspired by true

sympathy, by a real understanding of the minds and feelings of those whom it is sought to benefit. But such sympathy and understanding can hardly exist where there is also insistence upon distinctions of class. Those who have the leisure, education and income necessary for the work are handicapped by the whole of their past life and training. A man may be filled with the most sincere desire to accomplish a task of reform, but he is hindered by the very fact that almost from his birth he has been really encouraged to thank God that he is not one of the "common people." Upon the poor and the vicious he looks with the deepest sorrow; that sorrow is tinged with contempt. Try as he may, he cannot fail to feel a certain conviction of his own superiority, to take to himself a certain degree of credit for his virtuous self-sacrifice. Into all private effort towards the remedying of social evils, there enters a certain element of pauperisation. The poor feel that their benefactors are stepping down, as it were, from some lofty position to assist them; they either resent such patronage or tend to lose their self-respect; in either case, the efforts of the reformer are not attended with really satisfactory results. Even the efforts of the state are hampered in the same way. A

certain stigma attaches to those who accept the assistance offered to them by government; they are regarded as having sunk to a lower place in the social strata, and since in the existing order importance is attached to social position even by the very poorest, they suffer morally as a result.

Nor does the vitiating effect of class distinctions end here. The mere existence of those distinctions serves to induce a number of evils which have been pointed out time and again. Men and still more women labour to create the impression that they belong to some "upper" class; they desire to appear as the social superiors of their neighbours. Up to a certain point, this is wholly admirable; anything which encourages a man to endeavour to rise out of that position in which he was born is so far good. But the influence of the idea of class leads men to attempt to rise in a false sense. Influenced by that idea, they take houses which they cannot afford to maintain; they strive to live in a circle of richer neighbours. The attempt to "keep up appearances" has been and is the curse of thousands. It drives them to dispense with necessities that they may make a show of luxury; it forces them to resort to petty shifts; it induces them to

imitate the vices of the wealthy and to abandon reasonable restraint.

Those who have risen have been affected by the same curse. Their efforts have been directed to create a belief that they have not risen, that they have been born in a position of superiority. The hardest employers are generally those who have once been employees. It is not that their personal knowledge of the excuses of the idle enables them to detect malingerers with ease. It is rather that they wish at all costs to dissociate themselves from that despised class to which they originally belonged.

And social reform has been rendered doubly difficult by the attitude of the alleged "upper class," lay and ecclesiastical. Eager to retain political power in its own hands, the ruling class has endeavoured to emphasise class distinctions. Forced to conciliate the democracy, it has appealed to the vices rather than to the virtues of the many; it has attempted to corrupt rather than to raise. In England, this is true no less than in other countries. The English aristocracy has been constantly recruited from the masses, and if it has in a measure preserved a democratic character, yet it has perhaps been driven to greater social tyranny. Having no definite title

to rule, it has tried to create such a title by the invention of pedigrees; it has been affected by that very hatred of its origin which marks the employee who has risen to a position of command.

And the clergy have, in general, been efficient allies of the lay rulers. Formerly, they endeavoured to spread a belief in the doctrine of divine right, and though that doctrine has been practically abandoned as a political theory, yet its influence is seen to-day. An ingenious perversion of Christianity has been accomplished; it has been laid down that contentment with an existing position in life is a virtue, that discontent with the prevailing social order is a sin. And the clergy, more than any other one class, have set a pernicious example in encouraging the practice of " keeping up appearances."

The idea of class distinctions has indeed hampered all proposals for social reform. To receive assistance has been regarded as derogatory; and though this serves a useful purpose, in so far as it maintains self-respect, yet it has made the task of ameliorating the lot of the poor infinitely more difficult. It has rendered almost impossible the giving of such slight and temporary help in a time of crisis as should enable a man to tide over the period of stress, since if he is so

aided, his neighbours at once condemn him to social ostracism. No progress can, indeed, be made until class distinctions have been broken down, until a man's merit is gauged not by his wealth or by his parentage, but by his personal character. It must be recognised that all men are equal in rights; that the inequalities which do exist are less the outcome of justice than of the accidents of nature or the faults of government. It must be recognised that idle display and waste are to be regarded with contempt; men must learn to be ashamed rather than proud of the amount which they spend upon personal indulgence, and to regard the ostentation of wealth as degrading to the wealthy.

Such results could only come through a revolution in human nature, and hence it has been held that they can never be attained. It has been argued that mankind will never be delivered from sorrow in this world; that the poor will be always with us. It is inevitable that poverty should continue; all men have not the same earning capacity, nor could it be desired that superior merit should not meet with a superior reward. But poverty has been rendered more grinding, both by the fact that it has been regarded as a disgrace and by the fact that the

desire to acquire a "social" position has served to emphasise the evils of an inadequate income. It is possible enough to recognise that ability to maintain a liveried servant is no proof of merit; that no man deserves credit or reputation from the fact that he has inherited a large income or from the fact that he can trace his ancestry to the mistress of some king or to a Norman plunderer. And when this has been recognised by the generality of mankind, as it is already recognised by all who possess a shadow of intelligence, a great step will have been taken towards the solution of the social problem. Labour will increase in dignity; idleness will be the true source of disgrace. There will be the less desire for social position in all sections of the community, and hence many who are at present hampered and cramped by the supposed need for keeping up a certain position will be freed from much embarrassment.

This mental revolution will be hastened by the war. The growth of a better understanding between classes will create a wider sympathy; the most exclusive cliques will be to a certain extent democratised by the necessities of the present crisis. Thus, the officers' mess in most regiments will be filled with former serjeants and

privates; the old exclusiveness will be for ever swept away. There will be everywhere a deeper sense of the vital things of life; men will realise their duty to their fellow-men more thoroughly, nor will they claim merit for performing that duty.

Nor will the past attempts to make party capital from social legislation continue. Party spirit will in general be weakened, as it has already declined in face of the common danger. The character of legislation will become more national, and hence more efficient. There will be an obliteration of the old lines of party division, and there will be a similar obliteration of the old lines of class. Close contact will reveal to each the true character of the other. The so-called lower class will realise the merits and the defects of the so-called upper class. They will discover that the rich are not always vicious; they will discover also that they are not immune from faults, that the wealthy and the well-born are men of like passions with themselves. Revealed in their true character, for good or evil, the "upper class" will no longer be able to maintain the fiction of its intrinsic superiority. That waste which has resulted largely from a wish to emphasise the divergence of class will cease; extravagance will continue but will be minimised.

Luxury will rather be regarded as a vice than poverty. The war has afforded already an opportunity for reduction of expenditure, and with the restoration of peace the new simplicity of life will be generally maintained.

Thus one great cause of social distress will be removed; the keeping up of appearances will be abandoned. Shabby gentility will disappear; men will live as they may, not attempting to conform to some arbitrary and unreal standard. Self-respect will be increased; servility will decline, for those who have in the past rather laboured to pauperise the masses will now be inspired with sympathy for them and with a genuine desire to raise them from distress.

Morality will increase by the change in human nature. A large percentage of the immorality of England must be attributed to the existence of class distinctions. Those who have prided themselves with being members of an upper class have been callous as to the fate of women of a different social standing; though they would respect the virtue of their recognised equals, they have no respect for that of their supposed inferiors. But the spread of the idea of equality will serve to destroy this false opinion; it will also facilitate intermarriage between the different

classes and hence reduce still further the existing distinctions between them. And women of the former lower class will be less ready to feel themselves complimented when a "gentleman" insults them; their passion for luxuries will be diminished, and they will have the less desire to pose as members of the wealthy class. That absence of self-respect which has been born of distinctions between class will be remedied, and one of the chief causes of immorality will be removed.

Even the problem of population will be largely solved. Increased seriousness will produce also a greater sense of responsibility. The obligation not to bring into the world children who cannot be supported will be better realised; a sense of duty will limit the passions. The spiritual side of mankind will triumph over the animal. And the decline of luxury will free a large amount of capital for the work of production; production will increase, the demand for labour will grow. The life of man will be ordered upon more economic principles, but those principles will be refined by a deeper sympathy.

The present war is being waged against the exponent of divine right, against a dominant caste. It is a people's war, a war for liberty .

The cause of freedom will triumph, and with freedom equality will triumph also. The artificial barriers between man and man will be swept away, and with them will be swept away also many of the causes of human misery. The revolution will not be accomplished easily; the restoration of peace will not be the establishment of any Utopia. But in the future the world will progress steadily and not intermittently; men will no longer be driven to sigh that they are no better than their fathers.

XIV

THE FUTURE OF THE RACE

MANY have found the true essence of life in conflict; many have asserted that, if man were freed from all need to fight, he would be ruined morally and intellectually, and would sink into a state of coma, nearly akin to death. They have argued that men must always struggle with men; that the very law of self-preservation demands that there should be strife between nations, between parties, creeds and classes. The evil of war is far outweighed by its good; by it human nature is refined and exalted, and the supreme sacrifice of life itself wins a truer and fuller existence for those who survive. The conflict of parties within a state develops the mental capacity of the nation; bitter as it may be, it serves to ward off the calamity of political death. Even the quarrels of religious sects produce good; each is compelled to set or to keep its house in order, lest it should give just occasion to its rivals. The strife of class with class pre-

vents any degeneration into stagnant mediocrity. Pride of birth induces the practice of virtues which would otherwise cease to exist; the honour accorded to wealth is an incentive to effort. In the mental, no less than in the economic, relations of man with man vigorous competition acts as a stimulant and assists to promote real efficiency.

To those who hold such opinions, the dawn of an era of peace would be rather a cause for regret than for rejoicing. The world would be delivered from material ills, only to experience moral ills, far more insidious and far more pernicious; it would suffer intellectual death. Optimism is the creed of fools; pessimism is the only possible attitude for the wise man. The future can be no brighter than the present; this war can confer no greater benefits upon the human race than have been conferred by previous wars. For, if it leaves the world as it is, if armaments must still increase, if civilisation itself is at the mercy of selfish ambition, then the war will have been fought in vain and mankind will also have lived in vain. But if it produces an era of peace, if the conflict of man with man should cease, a new evil will be called into existence. The race will die, because life is no longer worth living. The

dilemma is complete; hope is useless, despair alone is sane.

This dilemma, however, is unreal; such pessimism is needless. Nothing is more certain than that the world will be changed by the present war, or that conflict of man with man will cease. The peoples of Europe have not engaged in the greatest struggle of history without reason; they have no intention of permitting in the future the existence of those factors which have made the struggle possible. It is clear that even if Germany triumphed, the old order would still pass away. Preserving her own military power, she would use that power to impose her will upon a congeries of client states; the armaments of all actual or potential rivals would be limited. Her supremacy would be that of a military caste, but it would crush militarism in all other lands.

And if the victory of Germany would, in a sense, strike a blow at the very system by which that victory would have been secured, the triumph of the allies will strike a far more deadly blow. Even if the governments of the allied states were ready to be untrue to the ideal for which they are fighting, their peoples would still hold them to their professions. War is being waged against Prussian militarism; Prussian militarism will be

destroyed. But no similar system will be created in England, France or Russia; men will not permit the establishment of a *régime* such as they will have attacked and defeated in the German Empire. Without the aid of a militarist spirit, however, war becomes impossible; war will, therefore, cease, and with its cessation the more subordinate forms of conflict will likewise disappear. Mankind will be inspired by the spirit of toleration, and that spirit is inimical to the violent conflict of man with man.

Yet the human race will not be condemned to death from inanition. That man can live only if he fights with his fellows is a fiction, vile and pernicious. It may excite the admiration of militarists, who can find therein an excuse for war; or of politicians, eager to defend their substitution of violent partisanship for statesmanship. It may appeal to religious bigots, who would justify their intolerance; to a would-be aristocracy, which would defend class rivalry and class tyranny. It may be adopted by employers and by employees, anxious to prove that their mutual hatred is justifiable. It has been cynically remarked that the waking thought of every Englishman is, " What can I kill to-day?" It is, in effect the waking thought of every violent

partisan, What idea can I kill to-day? And since murder is generally recognised as being a crime against divine law, it is not unnatural that all violent partisans should agree that to live and let live is to die.

But the fiction is one which can make no appeal to any man who is inspired by love for his fellows; it is a fiction which cannot be credited by any man who is possessed either of reason or of insight. Man might, indeed, be doomed to fight always with man, if he had no other foes with whom to contend. But he has such foes, and they are well worthy of his steel, well able to resist his attacks, hard to defeat. Against these foes the race has warred throughout the ages without attaining to victory. This failure has been due in no small measure to that internecine strife in which mankind has been from time to time engaged. Human energy has been largely directed to the destruction of human life; it has been diverted from the struggle against the enemies of all mankind. The progress of nations has been constantly interrupted by their own or their neighbours' aggression. That influence for good, which might have been exercised by churches, has been impaired by the rivalry of sects; the clergy of all ages and of all nations

have been more eager to secure the adoption of their own particular panacea than to effect the raising of the human race. Political parties have preferred an electoral victory to the welfare of the state. Their patriotism has been subordinated to the interest of faction: they have called good evil, and evil good, rather than admit the existence of any virtue in their opponents. Bigotry and intolerance have coloured all the relations of man with man; the welfare of the race has been immolated on the blood-stained altar of prejudice.

Such dissipation of energy could only be for the benefit of mankind if man had no enemies but his fellow-men. As it is, human development has been hampered; effort has been constantly misdirected. The end of that strife which has produced such evils will ensue upon the present war. Human ability and energy will be employed in the true service of mankind; conflict between man and man will cease. The new era will be one of war, but the war will be the struggle of the race against its eternal foes. Statesmen, scientists and theologians will lead the forces of civilisation against disease, physical and moral, against the ills resulting from the existing organisation of society, against those impalpable

enemies, victory over whom has as yet eluded humanity.

The field of conflict is wide. It will be long indeed before medical science has diagnosed accurately the more obscure diseases of mind and body; the cure of those illnesses which are now classed as incurable will need years of patient research; the stamping out of consumption alone is a task requiring ceaseless effort. The world labours also under the burden of many economic evils. It is admittedly intolerable that some should possess a superabundance of the world's good things, while others are enduring positive want; that thousands should be condemned to pass their lives in single rooms and in dark, cheerless and insanitary houses. It is incredible that such conditions must obtain for ever; the discovery of a remedy should not be beyond the ability of statesmen. Hitherto, the work of combating such evils has been interrupted because vested interests and class prejudice have combined with party feeling to obscure the issue and to discredit any suggested reform. The finding of a solution will in the future prove to be enough to occupy the attention and tax all the skill of politicians and publicists, even though they have no longer to counteract

the hostile designs of other states or to devise new terms of abuse with which to flagellate their political rivals. In vice of all kinds the race has a foe, insidious and powerful. If the churches cease to bicker, if they no longer wallow in " the mud of religious controversy," the ministers of religion still need not fear that they will be doomed to inactivity. That energy and ingenuity which are now expended in labouring to identify the Church of Rome with the " scarlet woman," or in attempts to prove apostolic succession, will find the fullest scope in the less exciting, but possibly more beneficial, work of promoting the increase of virtue and of defeating vice by the destruction of its causes.

Even if such physical, economic and moral ills were successfully overcome, the field for effort would still be almost limitless. New beauties in art, literature and music may be created; it is hard to believe that a time can ever come when such creation need cease. The undoing of past errors itself requires both energy and devotion. The world has been disfigured by the hand of man, in obedience to the inevitable demand for speed of construction and cheapness. Acres have been covered with unsightly slums, street after street of gloomy houses has been

erected, and the modern world has realised too late the evil which has arisen. But though such palliative measures as the prohibition of back-to-back houses have been found possible, insuperable obstacles seem to have appeared whenever a radical change has been mooted. Above all, the means have been lacking. Existing political conditions have driven even the most unaggressive states to build up armaments and to prepare for war. The death of militarism will free mankind from the nightmare of the past; the load of armaments will be taken off the shoulders of the race, and many millions, which have hitherto been expended in training men to take life and in providing them with the weapons of destruction, will now be freed to afford means by which life may be made better worth living, by which sunshine may be brought to multitudes, whose lot to-day is drab and darkened. The forces of nature, too, are as yet unshackled; the scope for invention is wide, and there are a thousand problems which have not even approached solution.

When all this is considered, it is clearly idle to fear that human energy will be able to find no outlet, that the race will perish from inertia if strife between man and man ceases. It is more

true that this energy will be redoubled; it will be directed into far more profitable channels. Through the ages men have largely pursued the evil, masquerading as the good; they have been obsessed by errors; the maxim *Si vis pacem, para bellum* has secured an undeserved currency, to the detriment of the race. Mankind has been misled and deceived by the false opinions so zealously propagated by those who, whether from self-interest or mistaken conviction, have desired the continuance of conflict between nations, parties, creeds and classes. Some slight progress has been made, only to be followed by disastrous reaction; the world has often appeared to be condemned to pursue for ever a gloomy cycle of blunders. To any permanent advance the imperfections of human nature seem to have presented an insurmountable obstacle.

But those who allege that mankind must for ever be the prey of evil are false prophets; they are the enemies of their kind, traitors to the sacred cause of humanity. Even in the past their falsity has been revealed, their treason unmasked. Two momentous events in modern history have proved that the search for happiness, for peace and goodwill, has not been wholly vain; they have shown that human nature can be

changed, and changed for the better. The Reformation freed the intellect of mankind from the fetters of a decadent mediævalism; the French Revolution expounded a new gospel of political liberty. Neither completed its task. The reformers sank into mere founders of churches; the revolutionaries degenerated into military conquerors. Both alike forgot their original mission; both alike became false to those ideals for which they had been ready to suffer and to die. Yet their work was not in vain, long as it has tarried for completion.

That completion is now on the eve of attainment. To-day, the world is torn by the last great struggle of man with man; victory will rest with the champions of liberty, progress and toleration. The War of the Triple Entente will complete the work of the Reformation and the French Revolution. It will give to mankind freedom, political, religious and social. It will sweep into the limbo of forgotten fallacies all those fictions by which strife of man with man has been made possible and has been perpetuated. Those artificial barriers, which human perversity has erected between states, parties, creeds and classes, will be broken down; the age of hatred will pass away, and a new era of love be born.

The future of the race is not dark with the black clouds of despair; it is bright with ardent hope, with the full assurance that the ideal, towards which the race has toiled, however haltingly, through all the ages, is at last to be attained.

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
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